A Theory of Zombie Lending

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Abstract

An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneur and the market. In this setting, zombie lending is inevitable: once the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, the bank will roll over loans even after learning bad news, for the prospect of future market financing. Zombie lending is mitigated when the entrepreneur faces financial constraints. Finally, the bank stops producing information too early if information production is costly.

Keywords: private learning, experimentation, reputation, relationship banking, information monopoly, debt rollover, zombie lending, adverse selection, dynamic games

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Zombie firms – firms whose operating cash flows persistently fall below their interest payments – are prevalent in the real world. According to a recent study (Banerjee and Hofmann, 2018), zombie firms make up about 12% of all publicly traded firms across 14 advanced economies. These firms are detrimental to the real economy: they crowd out credit to their healthy competitors, thereby reducing aggregate productivity and hindering investment. Zombie lending has long been perceived as the main reason behind Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s (Caballero et al., 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). More recently, Acharya et al. (2019) and Blattner et al. (2019) show Europe’s economic recovery from the debt crisis has also been plagued by banks’ lending to zombie firms.

Why do banks extend loans to firms that are likely unable to repay their loan obligations?

One explanation is through the lens of bank capital (e.g., see Bruche and Llobet (2013)). By extending “evergreening” loans to their impaired borrowers, banks in distress gamble for resurrection, hoping their borrowing firms regain solvency, or, at least, can delay taking a balance sheet hit. However, as documented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), well-capitalized banks also sometimes extend credit to their distressed relationship borrowers.\textsuperscript{1} Is zombie lending a natural and inevitable consequence in bank lending?\textsuperscript{2}

In this paper, we build a dynamic model of relationship lending and argue that even absent concerns about bank capital, zombie lending \textsuperscript{3} is inevitable but self-limiting. Our explanation hinges on the assumption that banks and private lenders have an informational advantage over market-based lenders. Consequently, a borrower’s reputation typically grows with the length of its lending relationship, because bad loans are initially liquidated. This growth of reputation in turn gives a bank incentives to roll over bad loans – evergreening – prior to passing the buck to the market. Therefore, zombie lending is inevitable. However, if the bank rolls over bad loans all the time, it can destroy the reputation benefits in the lending relationship and hence the bank’s incentive to engage in zombie lending in the first place. Therefore, projects that are found to be bad early on are liquidated, and no liquidation improves a borrower’s reputation or perceived quality. In this sense, zombie lending is also self-limiting. The liquidation policy offers banks incentives to conduct zombie lending for loans that turn out bad later on, because these

\textsuperscript{1}For example, FDIC (2017) shows that First NBC Bank, a bank headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and failed in 2017, was considered Well Capitalized from 2006 through February 2015 (p. 24). From 2008 through 2016, examiners criticized the bank’s liberal lending practices to financially distressed borrowers, such as numerous renewals with little or no repayment of principal, new loans or renewals with additional advances, and questionable collateral protection. Management extended new loans that were used to make payments on existing loans and to cover current taxes and insurance. First NBC also extended loans and allowed proceeds to be used to pay off other delinquent bank loans, again without any requirement for principal payments from the borrowers.

\textsuperscript{2}Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) also argue that low interest rates as opposed to weak bank capital contribute to the explanation for the rise of zombie lending. The channels through which low interest rates operate are largely unexplored, though.

\textsuperscript{3}Sometimes, people also refer to “zombie lending” as “extend and pretend” or “evergreening”. They all refer to the lending decisions to borrowers that are known to be in distress.
bad loans can be pooled with good ones.

Let us be more specific. We model an entrepreneur investing in a long-term, illiquid project whose quality is either good or bad. A good project should continue to be financed, whereas a bad project should be immediately liquidated. Initially, the quality of the project is unknown to everyone, including the entrepreneur herself. She can raise funding from either the competitive financial market or a bank that will develop into a relationship. Market financing takes the form of arm’s-length debt so that lenders only need to break even given their beliefs about the project’s quality. Under market financing, no information is ever produced. By contrast, if the entrepreneur borrows from a bank, screening and monitoring will produce “news” about the project’s quality. We model news arrival as a Poisson event and assume it is only observed by the entrepreneur and the bank. In other words, the bank and the entrepreneur learn privately about the project’s quality as time goes by. Meanwhile, all agents, including lenders in the financial market, can observe the time since the initialization of the project, which will turn out to be the important state variable. When the bank loan matures, the bank and the entrepreneur decide to roll it over, to liquidate the project, or to refinance with the market-based lenders. These decisions depend crucially on the level of the state variable, and they are the central analysis of the paper.

We show the equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds in time and therefore includes three stages. In the first stage, a project is liquidated upon learning the bad news, whereas loans for the other two types will be rolled over. During this period, the average quality of borrowers who remained with banks improves. Equivalently, remaining borrowers gain reputation from the liquidation decisions of the bad types. These liquidation decisions are socially efficient, and therefore we name this stage after efficient liquidation. In the second stage, however, all loans will be rolled over irrespective of the quality. In particular, the relationship bank will roll over the loan even if it has known the project is bad: this bank keeps extending the loan to pretend no bad news has occurred, a form of zombie lending which is inefficient. This result on banks rolling over bad loans can be interpreted as zombie lending. Finally, in the last stage, all entrepreneurs will refinance with the market upon their bank loans maturing – the market-financing stage.

The intuitions for these results are best explained backwards in time. When time elapsed gets sufficiently long, all entrepreneurs will become sufficiently reputable and switch to market financing, driven by the assumption that market-based lenders are competitive and have lower costs of capital. This outcome is the equilibrium in the last stage. Now, imagine a scenario in which bad news arrives shortly before the last stage. The relationship bank could liquidate the project, in which case, it receives a low liquidation value. Alternatively, it can roll over the loan and pretend no bad news has arrived yet. By hiding bad news today, the bank helps the borrower maintain reputation in order to refinance with the market shortly in the future. Such zombie lending dominates
liquidation, because very soon, the bank will be fully repaid during market refinancing. In this case, the expected loss will most likely be borne by the market-based lenders. By contrast, if negative news arrives early on, zombie lending is much more costly to the bank, due to both large time discounting and the high probability that before the time reaches the last stage, the project could have matured. If so, the expected loss will be entirely borne by the relationship bank. Therefore, liquidating the project is the preferred option.

Our equilibrium highlights three different sources of inefficiency relative to the first-best benchmark. First, as in standard dynamic lemons problem, a good borrower experiences delay in receiving market financing. Second, a bad borrower is no longer liquidated after the first stage, even though liquidation has a higher social value. Finally, an uninformed-type borrower refinances with the market in the third stage, which is too soon compared to the first-best benchmark. Notice this last source of inefficiency is contrary to that in the dynamic lemons problem: the inefficiency is not the existence of delay but instead the insufficient delay.

We show that the concern for zombie lending is mitigated under a financial constraint, which essentially limits the repayments from the borrower to the bank. In particular, this constraint leads to scenarios in which a bad project is liquidated, even though the liquidation value falls below the joint surplus if both parties choose to roll it over. As a result, the efficient-liquidation period becomes longer, and the zombie lending period becomes shorter.

Our interpretation of learning is the process of bank screening and monitoring, which generates useful information on the entrepreneur’s business prospect but cannot be shared with others in the financial market. Once we endogenize learning as a costly decision, we show the bank ceases to learn during the efficient-liquidation stage. Intuitively, the benefit of learning arises because an informed-bad bank could liquidate a bad project for the liquidation value. This learning benefit vanishes once time passes the efficient-liquidation stage. This result highlights a new type of hold-up problem in a lending relationship: the bank under-invests its effort in producing information when it anticipates the borrower will refinance with the market in the future. Note this result holds even if the relationship bank has all the bargaining power: it is unable to capture all the surplus – including current and the future – generated from learning. Knowing so, the bank under-supplies its effort in producing information.

Our paper is consistent with the existing empirical evidence and anecdotal stories summarized in subsection B. Moreover, the result on zombie lending offers a few testable implications. First, the age distribution of liquidated loans should be left-skewed, and gradually, loan renewals should contain more favorable terms. Second, our interpretation of the market-financing stage includes debt initial public offering, loan sales and securitization, and anticipated credit-rating upgrades. Our model predicts the positive-
announcement effect associated with loan renewals should be small or even zero if any of these events happens shortly after the renewal. More broadly, our result implies the development of financial markets, such as loan sales and securitization, as well as the improvement in bond market liquidity, can exacerbate zombie lending.

**Related Literature**

Broadly, our paper is related to three stands of literature. We build on the approach of dynamic signaling and private learning (Janssen and Roy, 2002; Kremer and Skrzypacz, 2007; Daley and Green, 2012; Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2015; Grenadier et al., 2014; Atkeson et al., 2014; Marinovic and Varas, 2016; Martel et al., 2018; Hwang, 2018; Kaniel and Orlov, 2020). In our model, news is private, whereas in Daley and Green (2012), news is publicly observable. Martel et al. (2018) and Hwang (2018) also study problems in which sellers become gradually informed of an asset’s quality. Besides the specific application to relationship banking, our model has different theoretical implications. First, sellers in these two papers only choose the time of trading, whereas in our model, the bank is also endowed the option of liquidation. This additional option, which is natural in the banking context, generates different dynamics and efficiency implications. In our paper, bad types initially choose to separate through gradual liquidation and only pool with other types once the reputation is sufficiently high. Whereas delayed trading is always inefficient in these papers, our paper additionally highlights insufficient delay for the uninformed types and the lack of liquidation for the bad types. Second, we study the problem in which learning is costly and endogenous and show how reputation and asymmetric information affect the incentives of learning. By doing so, we are able to discover a new type of hold-up problem in banks’ information production.

Our paper is among the first to introduce dynamic learning in the context of banking (also see Halac and Kremer (2018) and Hu (2017)). We extend previous work in relationship banking by Diamond (1991b), Rajan (1992), Boot and Thakor (2000), Parlour and Plantin (2008), among others, by studying the impact of dynamic learning and adverse selection on lending relationships. Whereas Diamond (1991a) emphasizes reputation buildup during bank lending, borrowers are financed with arm’s-length debt, and lenders’ decisions are myopic, implying lenders will never have incentives to roll over bad loans. Rajan (1992) studies the tradeoff between relationship-based lending and arm’s-length debt, without an explicit role of the borrower’s reputation. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) emphasize the role of lenders’ reputation in borrowers’ choices between bank versus market financing, whereas our paper emphasizes the borrowers’ reputation. Parlour and Plantin (2008) study the

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4Our model also has a public-news process to justify the off-equilibrium belief.

5The bank and entrepreneur can be thought of as the seller, whereas market-based lenders are buyers.
secondary market, where a bank may sell loans due to either a negative capital shock or if the loan is privately known as bad. They show how a liquid secondary market reduces a bank’s incentive to monitor. Our paper focuses on the dynamics of rolling over loans and studies dynamic reasons on why and how banks sell loans. Specifically, the concern for adverse selection is endogenous build-up over time and depends on the borrower’s reputation. Bolton et al. (2016) study the choice between transaction and relationship banking under a similar assumption: the relationship bank has a higher cost of capital but is able to learn the borrower’s type. The paper shows borrowers are willing to pay the relationship bank higher interest rates during normal times in order to secure funding during crises. Our paper has a different focus by showing that the superior information acquired by the relationship bank can result in inefficient zombie lending.

There is also a literature that adopts a dynamic-contracting approach to study relationship lending. Boot and Thakor (1994) show that a long-term credit contract enables the lender to use future low interests so that the equilibrium contract does not involve collateral once the borrower successfully repays a single-period loan. This implies that collateral usage will decline as relationship duration increases. Verani (2018) builds a quantitative general-equilibrium model and shows if the borrower has limited commitment, the lender is willing to accept delayed credit payments in exchange for higher continuation values. Sanches (2010) has a similar message that the optimal dynamic contract features delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Note that delayed payment and forgiveness are necessary for borrowers to remain in the lending relationship and repay in the future. Both features are different from zombie lending in our model, where lenders roll over credit to cover bad private news.6

Our explanation for zombie lending differs from existing theories that largely rely on regulatory capital requirements (Caballero et al., 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). Rajan (1994) uses a signal-jamming model and explains the phenomenon of rolling over bad loans by assuming myopic loan officers facing career concerns. In this literature, terminating a bad loan results in a negative shock to the bank capital, which can trigger regulatory actions including bank closure (e.g., Kasa et al. (1999)). This can make banks reluctant to recognize losses by writing off bad loans. In our paper, banks are well capitalized and zombie lending emerges in equilibrium because banks are forward-looking instead of myopic. In this sense, our explanation, based on the borrower’s reputation, complements the existing ones. Similarly, Puri (1999) shows that banks have incentives to certify a bad firm, hoping investors will invest and repay the loan. Her explanation focuses on the lender’s reputation, whereas our paper highlights the importance of the borrowing firm’s reputation. Our paper is also related to previous work on debt rollover

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6The reason that the relationship bank does not liquidate the borrower is fundamentally different. In the dynamic-contracting literature, the bank chooses not to liquidate in order to offer incentives for the borrower to remain in the relationship. In our paper, the bank chooses not to liquidate in order for the bad borrower to leave the relationship by refinancing with others in the future.
One related paper is Geelen (2019), who models the dynamic tradeoff of debt issuance and rollover under asymmetric information. In contrast to this literature, which mostly studies competitive lenders, we model one lender that becomes gradually informed – the bank – together with competitive lenders – the market.

I. Model

We consider a continuous-time model with an infinite horizon. An entrepreneur (she) invests in a long-term project with unknown quality. She borrows from either a bank that will develop into a relationship or the competitive financial market. Compared to market financing, bank financing has the advantage of producing valuable information but with the downside of a higher cost of capital and the possibility of information monopoly. Below, we describe the model in detail.

A. Project

We consider a long-term project that generates a constant stream of interim cash flows \( cdt \) over a period \([t, t + dt]\). The project matures at a random time \( \tau_\phi \), which arrives at an exponential time with intensity \( \phi > 0 \). Upon maturity, the project produces some random final cash flows, depending on its type. A good \((g)\) project produces cash flows \( R \) with certainty, whereas a bad \((b)\) project produces \( R \) with probability \( \theta < 1 \). With probability \( 1 - \theta \), a matured bad project fails to produce any final cash flows. In addition to the failure in generating the final cash flows, a bad project may also fail prematurely, in which case it stops generating any cash flows, including both the interim ones and the final ones. The premature-failure event arrives at an independent exponential time \( \tau_\eta \), where \( \eta \geq 0 \) is the arrival intensity. We sometimes refer to this premature failure as public news. We assume \( \eta \) is sufficiently low and can be zero, so that none of the main results depend on this public-news process.

Initially, no agent, including the entrepreneur herself, knows the exact type of the project; all agents share the same public belief that \( q_0 \) is the probability of the project being good. Obviously, if the project fails prematurely, all agents will learn the project is bad with certainty. At any time before the final cash flows are produced and premature failure occurs, the project can be terminated with a liquidation value \( L > 0 \). Later in Assumption 1, we impose a parametric assumption that \( L \) is higher than the value of discounted future cash flows generated by a bad project. Therefore, liquidating a bad project will be socially valuable. Note the liquidation value is independent of the project’s quality, so it should be understood as the liquidation of the physical asset used in production. For example, one can think of \( L \) as the value of the asset if redeployed.
Let $r > 0$ be the entrepreneur’s discount rate; therefore, the fundamental value of the project to the entrepreneur at $t = 0$ is given by the discounted value of its future cash flows:

$$
PV_r^g = \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi}, \quad PV_r^b = \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi + \eta}, \quad PV_r^u = q_0 PV_r^g + (1 - q_0) PV_r^b.
$$

(1)

Note the denominator of $NPV_r^b$ contains an additional term $\eta$, which accounts for the premature failure event.

**Remark 1.** Although we do not explicitly model the initial investment, one can imagine a fixed investment scale $I$ is needed at $t = 0$ to initialize the project. In subsection C.1, we derive the maximum amount that an entrepreneur is able to raise at the initial date. The project is not initialized if this amount falls below $I$.

### B. Agents and debt financing

The borrower has no wealth and needs to borrow through debt contracts. The use of debt contracts is not crucial and can be justified by non-verifiable final cash flows (Townsend, 1979). One can also interpret these contracts as equity shares with different control rights and therefore think of the entrepreneur as a manager of a start-up venture.

We consider two types of debt, offered by banks and market-based lenders, respectively. First, the entrepreneur can take out a loan from a banker (he), who has the same discount rate $r$. For tractability reasons, we assume a bank loan lasts for a random period and matures at a random time $\tau_m$, upon the arrival of an independent Poisson event with intensity $\frac{1}{m} > 0$. $m$ can therefore be interpreted as the expected maturity of the loan.

In most of the analysis, we study the limiting case of instantly maturing loans, that is, $m \to 0$. Subsection D solves the case with general $m$, where results stay qualitatively unchanged.

The second type of debt is provided by the market and thus can be considered public bonds. In particular, we consider a competitive financial market in which lenders have discount rate $\delta$ satisfying $\delta < r$. In other words, market financing is cheaper than bank financing. Regarding (1), let us define the value of the project to the market as

$$
PV_\delta^g = \frac{c + \phi R}{\delta + \phi}, \quad PV_\delta^b = \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{\delta + \phi + \eta}, \quad PV_\delta^u = q_0 PV_\delta^g + (1 - q_0) PV_\delta^b.
$$

(2)

The assumption $\delta < r$ captures the realistic feature that banks have a higher cost of capital than the market, which can be justified by either regulatory requirements or the skin in the game needed to monitor borrowers (see Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), e.g., and Schwert (2018) for recent empirical evidence). As we clarify shortly, the maturity of
the public debt does not matter, and for simplicity, we assume it only matures with the project.

Both types of debt share the same exogenously specified face value: $F \in (L, R)$. $F > L$ guarantees debt is risky, whereas $F < R$ captures the wedge between a project’s maximum income and its pledgeable income (Holmström and Tirole, 1998).\(^7\) All our results will go through if $F \equiv R$, but instead, some non-pledgeable control rents are accrued to the entrepreneur if the project matures. Note we take $F$ as given: our paper intends to study the tradeoff between relationship borrowing and public debt, rather than the optimal leverage. At $t = 0$, the entrepreneur chooses between public debt and a bank loan that will develop into a relationship. Once the bank loan matures, she can still replace it with a public bond. Alternatively, she could roll over the loan with the same bank, which may have an information advantage over the project’s quality.\(^8\) In this case, the two parties bargain over $y_t$, the interest rate of the loan that is prevalent until the next rollover date. The financial constraint that the entrepreneur has no wealth restricts $y_t$ to be weakly less than $c$, the level of the interim cash flows. For the remainder of this paper, we assume the bank always has all the bargaining power. The results under interior bargaining power will only differ quantitatively. The allocation of the bargaining power together with the financial constraint $y_t \leq c$ naturally lead to the result that $y_t \equiv c$. As we show shortly, this financial constraint limits the size of the repayment that the entrepreneur can make to the bank; therefore, the Nash bargaining outcome is sometimes not the one that maximizes the joint surplus of the two.

Because market financing is competitive and market-based lenders have a lower cost of capital, the entrepreneur will always prefer to take as high leverage as possible once she borrows from the market. Therefore, the coupon payments associated with the public bond are $cdt$.

Remark 2. We have assumed the entrepreneur is only allowed to take one type of debt. In other words, we have ruled out the possibility of the entrepreneur using more sophisticated capital structure to signal her type. See Leland and Pyle (1977) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) for these issues.

C. Learning and information structure

The quality of the project is initially unknown, with $q_0 \in (0, 1)$ being the commonly shared belief that it is good. If the entrepreneur finances with the bank, that is, if she takes out a loan, the entrepreneur-bank pair can privately learn the quality of the project

\(^7\)The maximum pledgeable cash flow can be microfounded by some unobservable action taken by the entrepreneur (e.g., cash diversion) shortly before the final cash flows are produced (Tirole, 2010).

\(^8\)We assume without loss of generality that the entrepreneur would never switch to a different bank upon loan maturity. Intuitively, the market has a lower cost of capital than an outsider bank and the same information structure.
through “news.” Private news arrives at a random time $\tau_\lambda$, modeled as an independent Poisson event with intensity $\lambda > 0$. Upon arrival, the news perfectly reveals the project’s type. In practice, one can think of the news process as information learned during bank screening and monitoring. We assume such news can only be observed by the two parties and no committable mechanism is available to share it with third parties, such as credit bureaus and market participants. In this sense, the news can be understood as soft information on project quality (Petersen, 2004). For instance, one can think of this news as the information that banks acquire upon due diligence and covenant violation, which includes details on the business prospect, collateral quality, and financial soundness of the borrower. In the benchmark model, we take the learning of private news as exogenous.

Section III solves the model in which learning incurs a physical cost, where we show the bank will only do so in the early stage of a lending relationship.

Although the public-market participants do not observe the private news, they can observe (1) the public news – whether the project has failed prematurely, (2) $t$ – the project’s time since initialization, and (3) whether the project has been liquidated. Therefore, the public can make inference about the project’s quality based on these observations. Let $i \in \{u, g, b\}$ denote the type of the bank/entrepreneur, where $u$, $g$, and $b$ refer to the uninformed, informed-good, and informed-bad types, respectively. Let $\mu_t$ be the (naive) belief on the project’s quality if the market lenders solely learn from the fact that the project has not failed prematurely. A standard filtering result implies

$$
\hat{\mu}_t = \eta \mu_t (1 - \mu_t),
$$

where $\mu_0 = q_0$. Note the public news could only be bad, which occurs if the project has failed prematurely.

Let us first describe the private-belief process, that is, the belief held by the bank and the entrepreneur. If the private news hasn’t arrived yet, the private belief remains at $\mu_t$. Upon news arrival at $t_\lambda$, the private belief jumps to 1 in the case of good news, and 0 if bad. To characterize the public-belief process, we introduce a belief system $\{\pi^u_t, \pi^g_t, \pi^b_t\}$, where $\pi^u_t$ is the public’s belief at time $t$ that the private news hasn’t arrived yet, and $\pi^g_t$ ($\pi^b_t$) is the public belief that the private news has arrived and is good (bad). In any equilibrium where the belief is rational, $\pi^i_t$ is consistent with the actual probability that the bank and the entrepreneur are of type $i \in \{u, g, b\}$. Given $\{\pi^u_t, \pi^g_t, \pi^b_t\}$, the public belief that the project is good is

$$
q_t = \pi^u_t \mu_t + \pi^g_t.
$$

For the remainder of this paper, we sometimes refer to $q_t$ as the average quality or the

\[\text{To simplify notation, we abuse notation and use } \{\pi^i_t, q_t\} \text{ to denote } \{\pi^i_{-}, q_{-}\}.\]
average belief.

Remark 3. Note that learning and the arrival of private news require joint input from both the entrepreneur and the bank. Therefore, we can think of learning as exploration and understanding of the underlying business prospect, which requires the entrepreneur’s experimentation and the bank’s previous experience in financing related businesses. In this sense, our model could also be applied to study venture capital firms. Alternatively, we can interpret learning as a process that solely relies on the entrepreneur’s input, which is independent of the source of financing, whereas only the bank gets to observe the news content through monitoring. Put differently, even without bank financing, the entrepreneur will still be able to learn from news about the quality of her project over time. Our results in section II are identical in this alternative setting, because in the lending relationship, the bank and the entrepreneur are always equally informed.

D. Rollover

When the loan matures, the entrepreneur and the bank have three options: liquidate the project for $L$, switch to market financing, or continue the relationship by rolling over the loan. Control rights are assigned to the bank if the loan is not fully repaid, and renegotiation could potentially be triggered. Let $O^{i}_{Et} + O^{i}_{Bt}$, $i \in \{u, g, b\}$ be the maximum joint surplus to the two parties if the loan is not rolled over, where $O^{i}_{Et}$ and $O^{i}_{Bt}$ are the value accrued to the entrepreneur and the bank, respectively. Because $F > L$, in the case of liquidation, the bank receives the entire liquidation value $L$ and the entrepreneur receives nothing, that is, $O^{i}_{Bt} = L$ and $O^{i}_{Et} = 0$. If the two parties are able to switch to market financing, the bank receives full payment $O^{i}_{Bt} = F$, whereas the entrepreneur receives the remaining surplus $O^{i}_{Et} = \bar{V}^{i} - F$, where

$$
\bar{V}^{g} = D_{t} + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi}, \quad \bar{V}^{b} = D_{t} + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta}, \quad \bar{V}^{u} = \mu_{t} \bar{V}^{g} + (1 - \mu_{t}) \bar{V}^{b}. \tag{5}
$$

In (5),

$$
D_{t} = \hat{q}_{t} D^{g} + (1 - \hat{q}_{t}) D^{b} \tag{6}
$$

is the competitive price of a bond at time $t$, where $D^{g} = \frac{c + \phi F}{\delta + \phi}$ and $D^{b} = \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{\delta + \phi + \eta}$ are the price for the bond of a good- and bad-type project, respectively. $\hat{q}_{t}$ is the average quality of the project conditional on refinancing with the market, and in the case in which all types choose to refinance, $\hat{q}_{t} = q_{t}$. The second terms in (5) are the discounted value of the final cash flows that the entrepreneur $i \in \{u, g, b\}$ receives upon the project’s maturity.

Two conditions need to be satisfied for a loan to be rolled over. First, $\bar{V}^{i}_{t} > \max \{L, \bar{V}^{i}_{t}\}$ so that rolling over is indeed the decision that maximizes the joint surplus. Second, because the interest rate of the loan $y_{t}$ cannot go beyond $c$, the bank needs to prefer rolling over the loan with interest rate $c$ to liquidating the project for $L$. 11
E. Strategies and equilibrium

The public history $H_t$ consists of (1) time $t$, (2) whether the project has failed prematurely, and (3) the entrepreneur’s and the bank’s actions up to $t$. Specifically, it includes at any time $s \leq t$ whether the entrepreneur borrows from the bank or the market and whether the project has been liquidated. For any public history, the price of market debt $D_t$ summarizes the market lender’s strategy. Given that the market is competitive, the price of debt satisfies (6).

The private history $h_t$ consists of the public history $H_t$, the rollover event, the Poisson event on the private-news arrival, and, of course, the content of the news. Essentially, the strategy of the entrepreneur and the bank is to choose an optimal stopping time, and at the stopping time, whether to liquidate the project or refinance with the market. This choice is subject to the additional constraint that at the stopping time, the bank’s continuation value is at least (weakly) greater than $L$, the liquidation value of the project.

Let $V^u_t$ be the joint value of the entrepreneur and the bank in the lending relationship, let $B^u_t$ the continuation value of the bank, and let $\tau^u_i$ the (realized) stopping time of type $i \in \{u, g, b\}$. We thus have

$$V^u_t = \max_{\tau^u \geq t} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_t^{-}\left\{ \int_t^{\tau^u} e^{-r(s-t)}cds + e^{-r(\tau^u-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\phi} \left[ \mu_{\tau_\phi} + (1 - \mu_{\tau_\phi}) \theta \right] R + 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\eta} \cdot 0 ight. \right. ight. \\
+ 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\lambda} \left[ \mu_{\tau_\lambda} V^g_{\tau_\lambda} + (1 - \mu_{\tau_\lambda}) V^b_{\tau_\lambda} \right] + 1_{\tau^u < \min\{\tau_\phi, \tau_\lambda, \tau_\eta\}} \max\{L, \bar{V}^u_{\tau^u} \} \left. \left. \right] \right\} \right\},$$

(7)

and

$$B^u_t = \mathbb{E}_t^{-}\left\{ \int_t^{\tau^u} e^{-r(s-t)}cds + e^{-r(\tau^u-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\phi} \left[ \mu_{\tau_\phi} + (1 - \mu_{\tau_\phi}) \theta \right] F + 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\eta} 0 \\
+ 1_{\tau^u \geq \tau_\lambda} \left[ \mu_{\tau_\lambda} B^g_{\tau_\lambda} + (1 - \mu_{\tau_\lambda}) B^b_{\tau_\lambda} \right] + 1_{\tau^u < \min\{\tau_\phi, \tau_\lambda, \tau_\eta\}} \max\{L, \min\{\bar{V}^u_{\tau^u}, F\} \} \right. \right\}. \right.$$  

(8)

In (7), $\tau^u$ is the stopping time of the entrepreneur and the bank if both are uninformed.

The first term, $\int_t^{\tau^u} e^{-r(s-t)}cds$, is the value of interim cash flows until $\tau^u$. The project matures and pays off the final cash flows if $\tau^u \geq \tau_\phi$. If $\tau^u \geq \tau_\eta$, the project fails

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$^{10}$We use the standard notation $\mathbb{E}_t[-] = \mathbb{E}[\cdot|h_t^-]$ to indicate the expectation is conditional on the history before the realization of the stopping time $\tau$.

$^{11}$Formally, let $t^u$ be the optimal stopping time to liquidate/refinance chosen by type $u$; then, $\tau^u = \min\{t^u, \tau_\phi, \tau_\eta, \tau_\lambda\}$. $\tau^g$ and $\tau^b$ can be similarly defined.

$^{12}$In the model with general maturity $m > 0$, $\tau_\eta$ is restricted to the set of the rollover dates.
prematurely, with continuation payoff being zero. If $\tau^u \geq \tau_\lambda$, private news arrives, after which the two parties become informed. Finally, if $\tau^u < \min\{\tau_\phi, \tau_\eta, \tau_\lambda\}$, the bank and the entrepreneur choose to stop before any of the above events arrives, upon which they either liquidate the project for $L$ or refinance with the market for $\bar{V}^u_{\tau^u}$. The decision is made subject to the constraint that $B^u_{\tau^u} \geq L$. Equation (8) can be interpreted similarly.

We look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.

Definition 1: An equilibrium of the game satisfies the following:

1. Optimality: The rollover decisions are optimal for the bank and the entrepreneur, given the belief processes $\{\pi^u_t, \mu_t, q_t\}$.

2. Belief Consistency: For any history on the equilibrium path, the belief process $\{\pi^u_t, \pi^g_t, \pi^b_t\}$ is consistent with Bayes’ rule.


4. No (unrealized) Deals: For any $t > 0$ and $i \in \{u, g, b\}$,

$$V^u_i \geq \mathbb{E}[D^i|\mathcal{H}_t, D^i \leq D^g] + \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} + \mu_t \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} + (1 - \mu_t) \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta},$$

where

$$D^u = \mu_t D^g + (1 - \mu_t) D^b.$$

5. Belief Monotonicity: Continued bank financing is never perceived as a (strictly) negative signal, $\dot{q}_t \geq \eta q_t (1 - q_t)$.

The first three conditions are standard. The No-Deals condition follows Daley and Green (2012), reflecting the requirement that the market cannot profitably deviate by making an offer that the entrepreneur and the bank will accept. Note the second terms on the right-hand side of the No-Deals condition reflect the fact that even after market refinancing, the entrepreneur’s continuation payoff is still type specific.

As is standard in the literature, we use a refinement to rule out unappealing equilibria that arise due to unreasonable beliefs. Specifically, we impose a belief-monotonicity refinement that requires that continued bank financing is never perceived as a (strictly) negative signal. As a result, the public belief about the project’s quality conditional on

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13 We offer a micro-foundation as follows. In each period, two short-lived market-based lenders simultaneously enter and make private offers to all entrepreneurs. This microfoundation will give rise to the No-Deals condition as in Daley and Green (2012).
bank financing is weakly higher than the naive belief process that is only updated from the public news that no premature failure has occurred yet. Effectively, this condition eliminates equilibria that can arise due to threatening beliefs. For example, suppose the belief is that a project that does not refinance with the market at time $\hat{t}$ is treated as a bad type; then, under some conditions, all types will be forced to refinance at time $\hat{t}$.

F. Parametric assumptions

To make the problem interesting, we make the following parametric assumptions.

Assumption 1: (Liquidation value):

$$PV^b_\delta < L < \frac{\delta + \phi}{r + \phi} D^g + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi}. \tag{9}$$

The first half of Assumption 1 says the liquidation value $L$ is above the discounted cash flows of a bad project to the market. Therefore, liquidating a bad project is socially optimal. The second half assumes that if a bad-type borrower can refinance with the market at a price of a good-type’s bank debt, it will not liquidate the project. Note this assumption implies $L < PV^g_t$, so that continuing a good project is socially optimal. In the absence of the liquidation option, the equilibrium results are straightforward. In particular, all types of borrowers will immediately finance with the market at $t = 0$.\(^{14}\) As we will see in the next section, this result is no longer true with the option to liquidate.

Assumption 2: (Risky loan):

$$F > \max \{\theta R, L, D^b\}. \tag{10}$$

Assumption 2 assumes the face value of the debt is above the liquidation value, the expected repayment, and the price of the bond of a bad project; otherwise, the loan is effectively riskless.

Assumption 3: (Interim cash flow):

$$c \geq rF. \tag{11}$$

Assumption 3 guarantees the size of the interim cash flow $c$ is large enough to compensate the lenders’ cost of capital. Otherwise, the face value of the loan $F$ needs to grow during rollover dates.

\(^{14}\)The proof follows directly from applying the Law of Iterated Expectation and the assumption that bank financing is more costly.
Assumption 4: (Optimal bank financing):

\[ D^b < \frac{\delta + \phi}{r + \phi} D^g \] (12)
\[ PV^b_\delta < \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta}. \] (13)

This assumption imposes restrictions so that at least some level of bank financing will be used in the first-best benchmark. (12) is the static lemons condition in the literature (Daley and Green, 2012; Hwang, 2018), which requires that the price of a bad-type bond be lower than the value of a good-type loan. Given Assumption 1, (13) essentially requires \( \lambda \) to be sufficiently high so that the private news produced during bank financing is sufficiently useful.

The first-best outcome is achieved if the private news could be publicly observable.

Proposition 1: A unique pair \( \{\mu_{FB}, \mu_{FB}\} \) exists such that in the first-best benchmark,

1. If \( q_0 \leq \mu_{FB} \), the unknown project is liquidated at \( t = 0 \).
2. If \( q_0 \in (\mu_{FB}, \mu_{FB}) \), the unknown project is financed with the bank at \( t = 0 \).
3. If \( q_0 \geq \bar{\mu}_{FB} \), the unknown project is financed with the market at \( t = 0 \).

Assumption 1 leads to the result that any good project will immediately receive financing from the market, whereas a bad project will be liquidated upon news arrival. According to Proposition 1, an unknown project with belief \( q_0 \in (\mu_{FB}, \bar{\mu}_{FB}) \) should start with bank financing due to the option value of information. Over time, either news or the premature failure event may arrive, at which point the project receives immediate market financing following good news and is immediately liquidated following bad news. In the absence of news and premature failure event, the belief on the project follows (3). In this case, the project will be financed with the market once \( \mu_t \) reaches \( \bar{\mu}_{FB} \).

For the remainder of this paper, we assume \( q_0 \in (\mu_{FB}, \bar{\mu}_{FB}) \).

II. Equilibrium

We solve the model in this section. In subsection A, we study an economy without the financial constraint that the interest rate of loan satisfies \( y_t \leq c \). The main result is that a zombie lending region \( [t_b, t_g] \) exists during which the bank will always roll over the loan, even if it already knows the borrower’s project is bad. Subsection B studies the equilibrium with a formal treatment of the financial constraint \( y_t \leq c \). We show the equilibrium structure is similar to the one in subsection A, but the constraint reduces the length of the zombie lending region. We present a special case without premature failure in subsection C, where all results are derived in simple and closed form. Subsection D
further extends the analysis to loans with general maturity and studies the effect of loan maturity.

A. Benchmark without the financial constraint \( y_t \leq c \)

The benchmark case without the financial constraint \( y_t \leq c \) essentially assumes a deep-pocked entrepreneur. In particular, the entrepreneur could borrow a loan with the interest rate \( y_t \) above \( c \). Given the Nash bargaining assumption at each rollover date, we can treat the bank and the entrepreneur as one entity, and the problem for the entity is to choose two optimal stopping times. First, it decides when to liquidate the project. Second, it decides when to switch to market financing by replacing the loan with the public debt.

The economy is characterized by state variables in private and public beliefs. All public beliefs (without liquidation and public news) turn out to be deterministic functions of the time elapsed. Therefore, we use time \( t \) as the state variable. Specifically, we construct an equilibrium characterized by two thresholds \( \{t_b, t_g\} \), as illustrated by Figure 1. If \( t \in [0, t_b] \), the bank and the entrepreneur will liquidate the project upon the arrival of bad news – efficient-liquidation region. Loans for other types (good and unknown) will be rolled over. If \( t \in [t_b, t_g] \), all types of loans will be rolled over, including the bad ones – zombie lending region. Finally, if \( t \in [t_g, \infty) \), the two entities will always refinance with the market upon loan maturity – market financing.\(^\text{15}\)

![Figure 1: Equilibrium regions](image)

Given the equilibrium conjecture, the evolution of beliefs follow Lemma 1.

\textbf{Lemma 1:} In an equilibrium with thresholds \( \{t_b, t_g\} \), the belief on a project’s average quality evolves according to

\[
\dot{q}_t = \begin{cases} 
(\lambda + \eta) q_t (1 - q_t) & t \leq t_b \\
\eta q_t (1 - q_t) & t > t_b 
\end{cases}
\]

\textit{with the initial condition} \( q_0 \).

Heuristically, before \( t \) reaches \( t_b \), \( q_t \) evolves as if the premature failure arrives at rate \( \lambda + \eta \), because a project will be immediately liquidated following bad private news. After \( t \)

\(^{15}\)With instantly maturing loans, all banks and entrepreneurs will refinance with the market immediately at \( t_g \). In the case with general maturity, the market financing region is \( [t_g, \infty) \), depending on when the bank loan matures.
reaches $t_b$, however, $q_t$ evolves as if no private news exists at all, because a privately-known bad project will no longer be liquidated.

Next, we characterize the continuation value in different equilibrium regions, as well as the boundary conditions. To better explain the economic intuition, we describe the results backwards in the time elapsed.

**Market Financing:** $\{t_g\}$. In this region, $V_t^i = \tilde{V}_t^i$, $i \in \{u, g, b\}$, where $\{\tilde{V}_t^u, \tilde{V}_t^g, \tilde{V}_t^b\}$ have been defined in (5) with $\tilde{q}_t = q_t$. Let us offer the economic intuition. Ultimately, if the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, market financing is cheaper because market lenders are competitive, and they have a lower cost because $\delta < r$. As a result, all types will replace their loans with public bonds. The threshold in reputation is obtained as the public belief $q_t$ increases to $\bar{q}$. As we show below, this increase is accomplished because in equilibrium, bad types would have failed prematurely or been liquidated. The absence of both premature failure and liquidation helps the entrepreneur accumulate reputation.

**Zombie Lending:** $[t_b, t_g)$. Working backwards, we now consider the region $[t_b, t_g)$ during which all types of loans, including bad ones, are rolled over. Mathematically, the value functions of all three types satisfy the following Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman (HJB) equation system:

$$ (r + \phi + \lambda + (1 - \mu_t) \eta) V_t^u = \dot{V}_t^u + c + \phi [\mu_t + (1 - \mu_t) \theta] R + \lambda [\mu_t V_t^g + (1 - \mu_t) V_t^b] $$

(15a)

$$ (r + \phi) V_t^g = \dot{V}_t^g + c + \phi R $$

(15b)

$$ (r + \phi + \eta) V_t^b = \dot{V}_t^b + c + \phi \theta R. $$

(15c)

The first term on the right-hand side (15a) is the change in valuation due to time, the second term captures the benefits of interim cash flow, and the third term corresponds to the event of project maturity, which arrives at rate $\phi$. In this case, the bank and the entrepreneur receive the final cash flows $R$ with probability $\mu_t + (1 - \mu_t) \theta$. The fourth term stands for the arrival of private news at rate $\lambda$. Following the news, the bank and the entrepreneur become informed. Equations (15b) and (15c) can be interpreted in a similar vein.

When time gets close to $t_g$, the bank and entrepreneur find that waiting until $t_g$ and refinancing with the market is optimal, even if bad news has arrived. Intuitively, rolling over bad loans allows the bank to be fully repaid at $t_g$. When time is close to $t_g$, this decision can be optimal compared to liquidating the project for $L$. In this region, even though no project is liquidated, the entrepreneur’s reputation keeps growing as long as the project does not fail prematurely.
We show \( t_g - t_b > 0 \), implying zombie lending is inevitable in a dynamic lending relationship. Equilibrium in this region is clearly inefficient. A bad project should be liquidated, but instead, the bank and the entrepreneur roll it over in the hope of passing the losses onto the market lenders at \( t_g \). As we see next, by not liquidating between 0 and \( t_b \), they have accumulated a good reputation; therefore, zombie lending can be sustained in equilibrium.

**Efficient Liquidation:** \([0, t_b)\) Finally, we turn to the first region \([0, t_b)\), where bad loans are not rolled over but instead liquidated. Mathematically, \( V^u_t \) and \( V^g_t \) are still described by (15a) and (15b), whereas \( V^b_t = L \). At the early stage of the lending relationship, only the uninformed and informed-good types roll over maturing loans. By contrast, a bank that has learned the project is bad chooses to liquidate. Assumption 1 guarantees liquidation possesses a higher value than continuing the project. By continuity, liquidation still has a higher payoff if type \( b \) needs to wait for a long time (until \( t_g \) in this case) to refinance. As a result, zombie lending is suboptimal because \( t_g \) is far into the future: the firm could likely default or fail prematurely before it reaches the stage of market financing. The equilibrium is socially efficient in this region. The result \( t_b > 0 \) implies the bank cannot conduct zombie lending all the time. In this sense, zombie lending is self-limiting.

**Boundary Conditions:** The following two boundary conditions are needed to pin down \( \{t_b, t_g\} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
V^b_{t_b} &= L \quad \text{(16a)} \\
V^g_{t_g} &= \hat{V}^g_{t_g} = \left( D^g - D^b \right) \eta q_{t_g} \left( 1 - q_{t_g} \right).
\end{align*}
\]

(16a) is the indifference condition for the bad type to liquidate at \( t_b \), which is the standard value-matching condition in optimal stopping problems. In this case, rolling over brings the same payoff \( L \), and thus by continuity and monotonicity, she prefers liquidating when \( t < t_b \) and rolling over when \( t > t_b \). The second condition, smooth pasting, comes from the No-Deals condition and the belief monotonicity refinement. We show in the appendix that if this condition fails, type \( g \) will have strictly higher incentives to switch to market financing before \( t_g \). Intuitively, because a bad project’s present value falls below the liquidation value, the equilibrium decision of refinancing with the market must be one with pooling. Given the pooling structure in market refinancing, the smooth-pasting condition solves the optimal-stopping-time problem for the good types. The smooth-pasting condition picks the earliest \( t_g \) for the good entrepreneur to refinance with the market. With the boundary conditions, we can uniquely pin down \( \{t_b, t_g\} \), given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2: A $\bar{\eta}$ exists such that if $\eta < \bar{\eta}$ and $V_0^u \geq \max \{L, \bar{V}_0^u\}$, a unique monotone equilibrium exists in the absence of financial constraints and is characterized by thresholds $t_b$ and $t_g$, where

$$t_b = \frac{1}{\lambda + \eta} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1 - q_0}{q_0 \bar{q}} \right) - \eta(t_g - t_b) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

$$t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi + \eta} \log \left( \frac{\bar{V}_t^b - PV_r^b}{L - PV_r^b} \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

and $\bar{q}$ solves

$$\bar{q}^2 - \left(1 - \frac{r + \phi}{\eta}\right) \bar{q} + \frac{r + \phi}{\eta} \left( \frac{D^b}{D^g - D^b} - \frac{\delta + \phi}{r + \phi} \frac{D^g}{D^g - D^b} \right) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

The condition $\eta < \bar{\eta}$ is not necessary but helps simplify the expositions. Intuitively, as $\eta$ becomes sufficiently low, the No-Deals condition is always slack for the uninformed type after $t = 0$ so that they would never be interested in refinancing with only bad types.\(^{16}\)

The other condition, $V_0^u \geq \max \{L, \bar{V}_0^u\}$, requires the uninformed type to choose bank financing at $t = 0$: the continuation value exceeds both the value of immediate mark et financing and liquidation. In the appendix, we provide a closed-form expression for $V_0^u$ that allows us to write this condition in term of primitives.

Proposition 2 shows that the length of the zombie lending period (equation (18)) is sufficiently long to deter bad types from mimicking others at $t_b$: whereas $\bar{V}_t^b - PV_r^b$ captures the additional benefit of zombie lending until $t_g$, the denominator term in the logarithm function $L - PV_r^b$ captures the relative benefit of liquidating the project at $t_b$. Equation (17) shows that the length of the efficient-liquidation period $t_b$ gets shorter as public news arrival is more likely (i.e., higher $\eta(t_g - t_b)$) during the zombie lending period.

Intuitively, when public news is more likely to reveal the project’s type, the reputation of the project grows faster. Therefore, the length of the initial efficient-liquidation stage, during which reputation grows without liquidation, is necessarily shorter.

Our core mechanism shares similarities with Hwang (2018): on the specific results of equilibrium in the last two regions, the difference is a matter of equilibrium selection, which lies between pure strategies and mixed strategies. In absence of external news ($\eta = 0$), our pure-strategy equilibrium is payoff equivalent to the mixed-strategy one identified there: there is an expected delay in receiving a high offer, whereas in our paper, the delay in receiving the high offer is deterministic. Moreover, the efficiency benchmark in our paper is different from existing papers on dynamic lemons market. A

\(^{16}\)If $\eta$ becomes very high, the average belief on the uninformed type increases quickly after $t = 0$ so that the No-Deals condition for type $u$ may bind after $t = 0$ even if it holds at $t = 0$. In other words, the uninformed types’ incentives to pool with bad types can be non-monotonic or even increase over time. These cases are analyzed in the appendix.
comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 immediately highlights the inefficiencies with the good and the bad type. Delay in market financing occurs for a good-type project, which is similar to the standard inefficiency in the dynamic lemons literature. A bad project is no longer liquidated after $t_b$. Moreover, a comparison between $\mu_{tg}$ and $\mu_{FB}$ highlights an interesting source of inefficiency for the uninformed type. The uninformed type obtains market financing at $t_g$, which is too soon.\footnote{Note that under $\eta = 0$, $\mu_{tg} = q_0$ so that the result holds trivially. Under continuity, the corollary holds for $\eta$ sufficiently small.}

Corollary 1: \textit{Under the parametric conditions in Proposition 2, $\mu_{tg} < \mu_{FB}$.}

Notice this last source of inefficiency is the opposite of the inefficiency in the dynamic lemons literature: the inefficiency in our model is not the existence of delay, but instead, the insufficient delay. The uninformed types give up the option value of information after $t_g$ due to the option of market refinancing.

Remark 4. We specify a pessimistic belief during $[t_b, t_g)$ off the equilibrium path: any entrepreneur who seeks market financing during this period will be treated as a bad one and will be unable to refinance with the market. As in other signaling models, multiple off-equilibrium beliefs exist that could sustain the equilibrium outcome. The pessimistic belief is one of them, and perhaps the one most commonly used. In subsection 5.1, we consider an extension in which the lending relationships may break up exogenously, so some entrepreneurs always seek market financing on the equilibrium path, and hence specifying off-equilibrium beliefs is unnecessary. The structure of the equilibrium is similar, and we show the equilibrium outcome converges to the one in our model when the probability of the exogenous breakup goes to zero. We can show that market belief in the limit is the one that makes the bad type indifferent between rolling over bad loans and immediately financing with the market, and no discontinuity exists in beliefs at $t_g$. In other words, the refinement selects an off-equilibrium belief that is continuous in time. That said, throughout the paper, we continue to use the pessimistic off-equilibrium belief because it is more convenient and commonly used in the literature.

\section*{B. Equilibrium under the financial constraint $y_t \leq c$}

Our benchmark case applies to a scenario in which the Coase theorem holds, so that frictionless bargaining and negotiation will lead to the efficient allocation between the entrepreneur and the bank. Therefore, at each rollover date, a loan will be rolled over if the joint surplus is above the liquidation value $L$. In this subsection, we formally analyze the model with the financial constraint $y_t \leq c$. Clearly, the Coase theorem no longer applies, and we need to study the incentives of the bank and the entrepreneur.
separately.\textsuperscript{18}

The HJBs for the value function \(\{V^i_t, i \in \{u, g, b}\}\) remain unchanged from those in subsection A. Again, we can use two thresholds \(\{t_b, t_g\}\) to characterize the equilibrium solutions. Let us now turn to the boundary conditions. First, the smooth-pasting condition continues to hold, because it selects the equilibrium in which a good-type entrepreneur chooses to refinance with the market as early as possible. Note the smooth-pasting condition pins down \(\bar{q}\), implying the average quality financed by the market remains unchanged under the financial constraint. The second boundary condition – value matching at \(t_b\) – is different. In particular, because the entrepreneur is financially constrained and cannot repay its loan before \(t_g\), the bank has the right to liquidate the project. It chooses to roll over the loan only if its continuation value lies above \(L\). As a result, the value-matching condition at \(t_b\) becomes

\[
B^b_{t_b} = L, \tag{20}
\]

instead of \(V^b_{t_b} = L\).

Proposition 3: If \(B^b_0 \geq L\), under the financial constraint \(y_t \leq c\) and the same parametric conditions in Proposition 2, the equilibrium is characterized by the two thresholds \(\{t_b, t_g\}\)

\[
t_b = \frac{1}{\lambda + \eta} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1 - q_0}{q_0} \frac{\bar{q}}{1 - \bar{q}} \right) - \eta (t_g - t_b) \right], \tag{21a}
\]

\[
t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi + \eta} \log \left( \frac{F - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi + \eta}}{L - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi + \eta}} \right), \tag{21b}
\]

where \(\bar{q}\) remains unchanged from Proposition 2.

A comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 shows the financial constraint \(y_t \leq c\) mitigates the inefficiency from zombie lending.

Corollary 2: The length of the zombie lending period \(t_g - t_b\) becomes shorter under the financial constraint \(y_t \leq c\). \(t_b\) becomes larger so that the period of efficient liquidation becomes longer.

Intuitively, the financial constraint \(y_t \leq c\) limits the size of repayments that the entrepreneur is able to make to the bank. Therefore, the constraint allows the bank’s continuation value to fall below the liquidation value \(L\), even though the joint surplus is still above \(L\). As a result, the bad project is liquidated more often, compared to the case without the financial constraint. Consequently, the length of the zombie-lending period \(t_g - t_b\) becomes shorter. This result highlights the role of financial constraints and their interaction with asymmetric information among different types of lenders. Whereas

\textsuperscript{18}Another financial constraint exists whereby the bond price at \(t_g\) must be at least \(F\), implying \(\bar{q} \geq \frac{F - D_g}{D_f - D_b}\). This condition turns out to always be slack, so we only focus on the constraint \(y_t \leq c\).
most of the existing empirical research on zombie lending has emphasized the effect of a financially constrained bank, our theory offers a new testable implication on the effect of financially constrained firms in the lending relationship. In particular, our results imply that as firms become more financially constrained, zombie lending could be mitigated.

\textbf{Numerical Example} \ Figure 2 plots the value function of all three types: whereas the left panel shows the joint valuations of the entrepreneur and the bank, the right one only shows those of the bank. In this example, \( t_b = 1.2921 \) and \( t_g = 2.1006 \). In the figure, the green, blue, and red lines represent the value functions of the informed-good, the uninformed, and the informed-bad types, respectively. The dashed horizontal line marks the levels of \( L \). Before \( t \) reaches \( t_b \), the bad type’s value function stays at \( L \), and all the continuation value accrues to the bank. Note that at \( t_b \), the bad-type entrepreneur’s value function experiences a discontinuous jump, whereas no such a jump occurs in the bank’s value function. This contrast is due to the financial constraint \( y_t \leq c \). Indeed, both value functions are smooth without this constraint.

This figure plots the value function with the following parameters: \( r = 0.1, \delta = 0.02, m \to 0, F = 1, \phi = 1.5, R = 2, c = 0.2, \theta = 0.1, L = 1.25 \times NPV_r^b, \lambda = 2, \eta = 1, \) and \( q_0 = 0.2 \).

Under Assumption 3, an informed-good bank can in principle charge an interest rate that is above the cost of capital \( r \), even though the loan will always be repaid. The private information therefore enables the bank to earn some rents. As illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2, these rents, or equivalent the inform-good bank’s value function (green line of the right panel) decrease over time. This pattern illustrates the dynamics of the bank’s ability to extract rents in a lending relationship. As time approaches \( t_g \) and the lending relationship will terminate soon, this ability to extract excessive rents...
from a good-type entrepreneur becomes more and more limited. This result highlights a distinction of our paper from the literature on loan sales and securitization. In loan sales and securitization, banks with good loans choose to retain a bigger share of the loans (or more junior tranches) for a longer period of time to signal the loans’ quality. The benefit is that by doing so, they receive more proceeds by selling the loans at higher prices. In our context, however, a good bank has the opposite incentive: it does not want to signal that its borrower is good. Instead, the good bank prefers to extract surplus in the lending relationship as long as possible. Once the borrower refinances with the market, the bank no longer receives any extra proceeds above the full repayment of the loan. Therefore, a good-type bank prefers to keep its borrower in the lending relationship, as opposed to selling or securitizing the loan.

C. No Premature Failure

In this subsection, we study a special case of our model in which no premature failures occur, that is, \( \eta \equiv 0 \). As a result, \( \mu_t \), the (naive) belief update from no premature failure, will always stay at \( q_0 \). Proposition 4 shows the results, in which we obtain simple and closed-form solutions for \( \bar{q} \) and \( t_g - t_b \).

Proposition 4: If \( \eta = 0 \) so that no premature failure occurs, the equilibrium is characterized by thresholds \( \{\bar{q}, t_b, t_g\} \), where

\[
\bar{q} = \frac{\delta + \phi D^g - D^b}{D^g - D^b}, \quad (22)
\]

\[
t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( \frac{F - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi}}{L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi}} \right). \quad (23)
\]

Compared to the case without premature failure \( (\eta = 0) \), the case with premature failure \( (\eta > 0) \) has a higher \( \bar{q} \) and lower \( t_g - t_b \).

(22) is a standard result in the dynamic lemons literature,\(^{20}\) which is obtained by solving \( q_t D^g + (1 - q_t) D^b = \frac{\delta + \phi D^g}{r + \phi} \). \( q_t D^g + (1 - q_t) D^b \) captures the competitive price of the bond, whereas \( \frac{\delta + \phi D^g}{r + \phi} \) captures the value of a good-type loan. Therefore, \( \bar{q} \) is the minimum quality \( q \) such that the value of the good-type debt to the bank is equal to the market’s willingness to pay for the debt of an average entrepreneur. The existence of premature failure \( (\eta > 0) \) reduces \( D^b \) and therefore increases \( \bar{q} \). Moreover, the presence of premature failure renders zombie lending by bad types more costly, because the project could fail during this period. As a result, the period of zombie lending gets shorter.

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\(^{19}\) In practice, 60% of the loans are first sold within one month of loan origination and nearly 90% are sold within one year (Drucker and Puri, 2009). As Gande and Saunders (2012) argue, a special role of banks is to create an active secondary loan market while still producing information.

\(^{20}\) See Lemma 3 of Hwang (2018), for example.
Proposition 4 implies that for firms with more transparent governance and accounting systems, the concern for zombie lending is mitigated.

Our next corollary shows some interesting comparative static results on the amount of zombie lending and credit quality with respect to primitive variables.

Corollary 3: In the case of $\eta = 0$, $\bar{q}$ increases with $\delta$, decreases with $r$ and $\theta$, and is unaffected by either $\lambda$ or $L$. Moreover, $t_g - t_b$ decreases with $r$, $L$, and $\theta$, and is unaffected by $\delta$ or $\lambda$.

Let us offer some explanations for the results on $r$ and $\delta$. Note the role of the zombie lending period is to discourage bad types from mimicking other types at $t = t_b$, as is clearly seen in (23); whereas $F - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi}$ captures the additional benefit of zombie lending until $t_g$, the denominator term in the logarithm function $L - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi}$ captures the relative benefit of liquidating the project at $t_b$.

Intuitively, lower $\delta$ is associated with cheaper market financing. Therefore, $\bar{q}$, the average quality of borrowers that are eventually financed by the market, decreases. By contrast, if the cost of bank financing $r$ becomes cheaper, credit quality $\bar{q}$ increases. Intuitively, if the bank’s cost of capital becomes lower, gains from trade with the market are lower, so a good type only refinances with the market if the average quality becomes even higher.$^{21}$

C.1. Initial Borrowing

Given that no asymmetric information exists at $t = 0$, and no bankruptcy cost exists, the entrepreneur would like to borrow as much as possible at the initial date. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume the loan takes the maximum pledgeable income $F$, in which case the entrepreneur is able to raise at most $B^u_0$ initially. If the entrepreneur needs to invest $I$ at $t = 0$, the project can only be initiated if $B^u_0 \geq I$. Proposition 5 describes the closed-form expression of $B^u_0$.

Proposition 5: In the case of $\eta = 0$, the entrepreneur’s maximum borrowing amount at $t = 0$ is

$$B^u_0 = q_0 \left[ \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + e^{-(r+\phi)t_b} \left( B^q_{t_b} - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) \right] + (1 - q_0) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} + e^{-(r+\phi+\lambda)t_b} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \right], \quad (24)$$

$^{21}$Obviously, if $r$ becomes even lower than $\delta$, the entrepreneur will never refinance with the market, and no zombie lending period exists.
where
\[
B_{t_0}^g = \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t_b)} \left( F - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right).
\]

Intuitively, \(B_0^g\) in (24) has two components. With probability \(q_0\), the project is good, in which case, the bank is able to receive payments \(\frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi}\) until \(t_g\), after which it is fully repaid. With probability \(1 - q_0\), the project turns out bad, and the bank has the option to liquidate it if the bad private news arrives before \(t_b\).

An increase in the cost of bank financing \(r\) may increase or decrease \(B_0^g\). On one hand, all the payments (interim and final repayments) are more heavily discounted when \(r\) increases. On the other hand, both \(\bar{q}\) and \(t_g - t_b\) become lower because the incentive to conduct zombie lending is lower. As a result, the entrepreneur is able to refinance with the market (in which case, the bank is fully repaid) earlier. The overall effect thus depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects.

An increase in \(\delta\) may also increase or decrease the initial borrowing amount \(B_0^u\). When market financing becomes more expensive, \(\bar{q}\) increases, as do \(t_b\) and \(t_g\). However, the effect of \(\delta\) on \(B_0^u\) includes two counter-veiling effects. First, if the project turns out to be good, the bank is able to extract excessive rents for a longer period of time, which increases the amount that it is willing to lend up front. Second, for the fixed payments, the bank needs to wait longer to be fully repaid, which decreases the amount that it is willing to lend up front. In the proof in the appendix, we offer details on conditions that characterize the monotonicity, where we show that, in general, an increase in \(\delta\) first decreases and then increases \(B_0^u\).

D. General Maturity

Our analysis so far has focused on the case of instantly maturing loans \((m \to 0)\). In this subsection, we describe the results for the general case where loans have expected maturity \(m\). We show that all our previous results go through.\(^{22}\) Moreover, we show how \(t_b\), \(t_g - t_b\), and \(\bar{q}\) vary with loan maturity \(m\). For simplicity, we focus on the case without premature failure, by taking \(\eta = 0\).

When loans mature gradually, bad projects are also liquidated gradually as their loans mature during \([0, t_b]\). In online Appendix ??, Lemma ?? describes the evolution of the public beliefs without liquidation. Moreover, we can generalize the HJB equation systems

\(^{22}\)Note the market financing region under general maturity \(m > 0\) is \([t_g, \infty)\), depending on when the existing bank loan matures after \(t_g\).
\[(r + \phi) V_t^u = \dot{V}_t^u + c + \phi [q_0 + (1-q_0) \theta] R \]
\[+ \lambda [q_0 V_t^b + (1-q_0) V_t^b] + \frac{1}{m} \mathcal{R}(V_t^u, \dot{V}_t^u) \]
\[(r + \phi) V_t^g = \dot{V}_t^g + c + \phi R + \frac{1}{m} \mathcal{R}(V_t^g, \dot{V}_t^g) \]
\[(r + \phi) V_t^b = \dot{V}_t^b + c + \phi R + \frac{1}{m} \mathcal{R}(V_t^b, \dot{V}_t^b), \]

where
\[\mathcal{R}(V_t^i, \dot{V}_t^i) \equiv \max \left\{ 0, V_t^i - V_t^i, L - V_t^i \right\}. \quad (27)\]

Note the equations systems are identical to those in (15a)-(15c), except for the last terms, which account for the event whereby the loan matures. In this case, the bank and the entrepreneur choose between rolling over the debt (0 in equation (27)), replacing the loan with the market bond (\(V_t^i - V_t^i\) in (27)), and liquidating the project (\(L - V_t^i\) in (27)).

Note that under general maturity, the entrepreneur in general does not get to refinance immediately after \(t\) reaches \(t_g\). Therefore, the expressions for \(\bar{V}_t^i\) are different from (5), and we supplement them in online Appendix ??.

The boundary conditions are unchanged. Again, we characterize the equilibrium in three regions.

**Proposition 6:** If the loan has general maturity \(m\), a unique \(m^*\) exists such that the equilibrium has three stages if \(m < m^*\). The liquidation threshold is given by
\[t_b = \min \left\{ t > 0 : \frac{q_0 (1 - q_0 + q_0 e^{\lambda t})^{\frac{1}{1-m}} - \frac{1}{m}}{1 + \frac{1}{m} \int_0^t (1 - q_0 + q_0 e^{\lambda s})^{\frac{1}{1-m}} e^{(\lambda - \lambda_s)s} ds} = \bar{q} \right\}, \quad (28a)\]

and \(\bar{q}\) follows (22).

1. **Without the financial constraint \(y_t \leq c\),**
\[t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( \frac{V_{t_g}^b - \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi}}{L - \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi}} \right), \quad (29)\]

where
\[V_{t_g}^b = \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi} - \frac{\phi R (1 - \theta) + \frac{1}{m} \frac{\phi (R-F) (1-\theta)}{r + \phi}}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}}. \quad (30)\]
2. Under the financial constraint $y_t \leq c$,

$$t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( \frac{r + \phi + 1/m}{(r + \phi) L - (c + \phi \theta F)} \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)$$

A simple comparison with the results in subsection C shows that when $m$ increases, $\bar{q}$ stays unchanged and $t_b$ increases, whereas $t_g - t_b$ decreases.\(^{23}\) Intuitively, $\bar{q}$ is determined as the lowest average quality at which a good-type entrepreneur is willing to refinance with the market. In this case, the condition of market financing is such that good types receive the identical payoff from staying with the bank and refinancing with the market. Thus, $\bar{q}$ doesn’t vary with the maturity of the loan.\(^{24}\) It takes longer for the average quality to reach $\bar{q}$ when the maturity $m$ increases, because bad projects are liquidated less frequently. Therefore, $t_b$ increases. Finally, after $t$ reaches $t_g$, bad types take longer to refinance with the market, and therefore $V^b_{t_g}$ decreases with $m$. Therefore, a shorter period $t_g - t_b$ could still deter bad types from mimicking at $t_b$.

When $m > m^*$ so that the maturity of the loan becomes sufficiently long, the equilibrium is characterized by one single time cutoff $t_{bg}$. From $t$ to $t_{bg}$, bad projects are liquidated, whereas market financing occurs right after $t_{bg}$. The boundary condition is captured by the value-matching condition $V^b_{t_{bg}} = L$.\(^{25}\) Intuitively, the zombie lending period is necessary to incentivize the bad types to liquidate early on. When the maturity of the loan becomes long enough, even if the market-financing stage has arrived, the bad types still need to wait until the loan matures to refinance with the market. For a higher $m$, the expected length of this period increases, so the project is more likely to mature before the next rollover date.

### III. Endogenous Learning

Our analysis has assumed learning and (private) news arrival as an exogenous process, which happens as long as the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from the bank. In this section, we analyze the model in which learning is endogenously chosen by the bank as a costly decision. We show that the equilibrium structure is still captured by thresholds $\{t_b, t_g\}$. An interesting result is that even if the cost of learning is very small, the bank will stop producing information before $t$ reaches $t_b$. Note this result goes through even if the bank has all the bargaining power in the lending relationship. Therefore, our analysis highlights a new type of hold-up problem in relationship banking: the bank under-supplies its effort in producing valuable information.

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\(^{23}\) $t_g$ may increase or decrease, depending on the magnitude of $\lambda$ and $r + \phi$.

\(^{24}\) Mathematically, the smooth-pasting condition, $V^g_{t_g} = 0$, leads to this result.

\(^{25}\) The smooth-pasting condition no longer holds. In general, $\frac{dV^g_{t_{bg}}}{dt} \geq 0$. 
Throughout this section, we assume $\eta = 0$ so that no premature failure occurs. We present the results with the financial constraint $y_t \leq c$, and the case without the constraints yields qualitatively similar results. The structure of the model stays unchanged from section I, except banks must learn the private news by choosing a rate $a_t \in [0, 1]$. Given $a_t$, private news arrives at Poisson rate $\lambda a_t$, and our previous analysis corresponds to the case in which $a_t \equiv 1$. Clearly, a higher rate leads to an earlier arrival of private news in expectation. Meanwhile, learning incurs a flow cost $\psi a_t$ so that a higher rate is also more costly to the bank. Heuristically, within a short period $[t, t + dt]$, learning benefit is $\lambda a_t \left[ q_0 B_t^g + (1 - q_0) B_t^b - B_t^u \right] dt$: with probability $\lambda a_t dt$, private news arrives, at which time the bank receives a continuation payoff $B_t^g$ with probability $q_0$ and $B_t^b$ with probability $1 - q_0$. The cost of learning is approximately $\psi a_t dt$ during the same period. Given the linear structure, the bank’s learning decision follows a bang-bang structure. Specifically, it chooses maximum learning ($a_t = 1$) if and only if

$$\lambda \left[ q_0 B_t^g + (1 - q_0) B_t^b - B_t^u \right] \geq \psi.$$  

(32)

Otherwise, it chooses not to learn at all, and $a_t = 0$.

Proposition 7: 1. If $\frac{\psi}{\lambda} < \frac{1}{r + \phi + \theta} \left( L - \frac{\epsilon + \theta F}{r + \phi} \right)$, an equilibrium characterized by $\{t_a, t_b, t_g\}$ and $t_a < t_b < t_g$ exists. The bank learns if and only if $t < t_a$.

2. Otherwise, the bank never learns, and the entrepreneur never borrows from the bank.

Let us offer some intuitions behind Proposition 7. If the bad project no longer gets liquidated, the value of an uninformed bank is a linear combination of an informed-good one and an informed-bad one, that is, $B_t^u = q_0 B_t^g + (1 - q_0) B_t^b$, which is the case after $t$ reaches $t_b$. As a result, after $t$ reaches $t_b$, the benefit of learning is zero, implying that in any equilibrium, banks may only learn for $t \leq t_b$. During $[0, t_b)$, when the bad projects still get liquidated, the value of becoming informed is positive because liquidation avoids the expected loss generated from a bad project (see Figure 3 for a graphical illustration.), that is, $q_0 B_t^g + (1 - q_0) L - B_t^u > 0$. In this case, information is valuable. The above proposition shows that if the cost of learning is sufficiently low, the bank learns until $t_a$. If the cost is relatively high, however, the bank will never learn, and consequently, entrepreneurs will never choose bank financing.

$\{t_a, t_b, t_g\}$ are given by the solution to the system of equations (??) in the online appendix. Corollary 4 offers the expression in the limiting case of zero maturity.
Corollary 4: As \( m \to 0 \), the thresholds in Proposition 7 converge to

\[
\begin{align*}
t_a &= \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[ \log \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{1 - \bar{q}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{q_0}{1 - q_0} \right) \right] \\
t_b &= t_a - \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( 1 - \frac{\psi/\lambda}{(1 - q_0) \left( L - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right)} \right) \\
t_g &= t_a + \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( \frac{F - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi}}{L - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi}} \right)
\end{align*}
\]

\( t_b \) is higher compared to the case with exogenous learning as in Proposition 6.

Figure 3: Graphical illustration of learning benefits

Note for \( t \in [t_a, t_b] \), the bank chooses not to learn in equilibrium. Off the equilibrium path, if the bank chose to learn, it would liquidate the project upon bad news. The reason that \( t_b \) needs to be strictly higher than \( t_a \) is to generate positive benefits from learning. When the learning cost \( \psi \to 0 \), \( t_b \) converges to \( t_a \).

Under endogenous learning, \( \bar{q} \) and \( t_g - t_b \) stay unchanged, whereas \( t_b \) increases. The reason is that \( \bar{q} \) is determined by the good type’s indifference condition between bank financing and market financing, whereas \( t_g - t_b \) is the length of the zombie lending period that is just sufficient to deter bad types from mimicking others at \( t_b \). Because both \( \bar{q} \) and \( t_g - t_b \) are determined by types that are already informed, they are unaffected when producing information becomes costly and endogenous. Finally, because less information is produced when learning becomes costly, bad types are liquidated less often, and the average quality \( q_0 \) takes longer to reach \( \bar{q} \), resulting in a higher \( t_b \).

Proposition 7 highlights a new type of hold-up problem in relationship lending that only emerges in the dynamic setup. Rajan (1992) shows that in a lending relationship, the entrepreneur has an incentive to underinvest her effort, due to the prospect of renegotiation following private news. Our paper shows the relationship bank will also underinvest in its effort in producing information, even if the bank has all the bargaining power and the cost of producing information is infinitesimal (but still positive). The reason is that
the prospect of future market refinancing prevents the bank from capturing all the surplus generated from information production, even though it has all the bargaining power. Knowing so, the bank under-supplies its effort in producing information.\textsuperscript{26}

**Numerical Example** Under the same set of parameters as in subsection B (except for \( \eta = 0 \)), with the additional parameter that \( \psi = 0.06 \) and \( m = 1 \), we can get \( t_a = 3.8350 \), \( t_b = 4.7861 \), and \( t_g = 5.1352 \).

Figure 4 illustrates the effect of loan maturity on equilibrium results. The dashed lines plot the same results under Proposition 6, where private news arrives exogenously. The differences between the solid and the dashed lines, therefore, capture the contribution from endogenous leaning. In general, two effects arise when the loan maturity gets longer. First, longer maturity reduces the option value of new information, because the bank must wait until the rollover date to act on new information. As a result, the incentive to produce information should be reduced. Second, longer maturity increases the risk that banks face by rolling over bad loans, which in turn increases banks' incentives to learn. In our numerical exercise, the second effect dominates so that \( t_a \), the boundary at which the bank stops learning, increases as loan maturity increases. Therefore, \( B^0_0 \), the amount of initial borrowing, decreases to compensate for the increased learning cost. The bottom two panels show that as a result, both \( t_b \) and \( t_g \) increase, whereas the difference, \( t_g - t_b \) stays unchanged.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Diamond et al. (2020) and Diamond et al. (2019) have a similar flavor that high prospective liquidity (akin to the availability of market financing here) results in reduced corporate governance and bank monitoring.

\textsuperscript{27}When maturity becomes even longer, the effect becomes non-monotonic. In the extreme case where the loan never matures, private news is useless, and \( t_a = 0 \). This latter pattern is captured by the second case of Proposition 7, in which bank financing is not used in equilibrium (equivalently, \( \psi \) gets very high).
Figure 4: Comparative Statics with Endogenous Learning

This figure plots the value function with the following parameter values: \( r = 0.1, \delta = 0.05, F = 1, \phi = 1.5, R = 2, c = 0.2, \theta = 0.1, L = 1.5 \times NPV^b, \lambda = 0.5, \) and \( q_0 = 0.2, \psi = 0.025. \)

IV. Extension and Empirical Relevance

A. Lending-Relationship Breakups

In practice, lending relationships may break up for reasons independent of the underlying project’s quality. For instance, the relationship may have to be terminated if the bank experiences shocks that dry up its capital or funding. In this subsection, we modify the model setup by assuming that with rate \( \chi > 0, \) the lending relationship breaks up, upon which the entrepreneur is forced to refinance with the market; otherwise, the project is liquidated immediately. For simplicity, let us focus on the case without either the premature failure (\( \eta = 0 \)) or the financial constraint \( y_t \leq c. \)

Note that with some probability, type \( u \) and \( g \) refinance with the market. As a result, the bond price always exists on the equilibrium path. An equilibrium is therefore defined as in Definition 1 without the refinement of No-Deals and belief monotonicity.
Proposition 8: A $q$ exists such that if $q_0 < q$, an equilibrium characterized by thresholds $\{t_\ell, t_b, t_g\}$ exists. The decisions of the good and uninformed types are identical to Proposition 4.

1. If $t \in [0, t_\ell]$, bad types liquidate their projects upon learning.

2. If $t \in [t_\ell, t_b]$, bad types liquidate their projects with probability $\ell_t \in (0, 1)$ upon learning. With probability $1 - \ell_t$, bad types refinance with the market.

3. If $t \in [t_b, t_g)$, bad types refinance with the market at some rate $\alpha_t > 0$.

4. If $t = t_g$, bad types refinance with the market immediately.

Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 8, which has the same qualitative features as the one in subsection A. The equilibrium in this modified game, however, necessarily involves bad types using mixed strategies. When $t \in [t_\ell, t_b]$, the bad types are indifferent between liquidating and refinancing with the market. In equilibrium, liquidating happens with probability $\ell_t$ so that the average quality of firms that refinance with the market lies strictly above $q_0$ on the equilibrium path. Panel 5a plots the probability of liquidation $\ell_t$. Note that $\ell_t$ decreases with $t$ during $[t_\ell, t_b]$, so that $q_{t+}$, the quality of the project conditional market refinancing as well as the bond price stay constant.

When $t \in [t_b, t_g)$, bad types play a mixed strategy between bank financing and market financing, implying some degree of zombie lending exists. Note that bad types cannot always remain in the lending relationship, because the equilibrium bond price will be too high. Instead, they voluntarily refinance with the market at a strictly positive rate even without the exogenous breakup.\footnote{Note they cannot refinance with an atomic probability, because the bond price will then fall to $D^b$.} Panel 5b plots $\gamma_t = \alpha_t \pi_t^b$, the flow rate of bad types that voluntarily seek market financing without the breakup on $[t_b, t_g)$.\footnote{The total flow of bad types is $\chi \pi_t^b + \gamma_t$.} As time increases, $\gamma_t$ decreases.

Panel 5c plots the bond price for borrowers who seek market financing between $[0, t_g]$. The price pattern is consistent with the bad types using mixed strategies in equilibrium. Between 0 and $t_\ell$, the price increases as bad types liquidate their projects. The price becomes a constant between $t_\ell$ and $t_b$ so that a bad type is indifferent between liquidation and market refinancing. After $t$ reaches $t_b$, the bond price needs to increase in order to make bad types indifferent between bank and immediate market financing.

The equilibrium of this modified game converges to the one in subsection A as $\chi \to 0$.\footnote{This limit can be interpreted as a refinement of the equilibrium in the spirit of trembling-hand perfect equilibria \citep{FudenbergTirole:1991}.} However, the average quality of the entrepreneurs who seek financing between $t_b$ and $t_g$, however, does not converge to 0. Instead, it converges to $q_{t+}$. In a game with $\chi \equiv 0$, if we impose
The off-equilibrium belief $q_t = q_{t+1} \forall t \in [t_b, t_g)$, only the bad entrepreneurs will choose to voluntarily refinance with the market. Therefore, the game with $\chi \to 0$ can serve as a micro-foundation to justify the discontinuity in beliefs in the game with $\eta = 0$ and $\chi = 0$.

Proposition 8 implies that conditional on market refinancing, the average quality of firms increases with the length of the lending relationship. This result is consistent with the negative-announcement effect of debt initial public offering, as we explain in the next subsection.

B. Empirical Relevance

In this subsection, we provide consistent empirical evidence and derive the model’s testable implications.

Dynamic Information Production and Liquidation

Our paper builds on a key assumption that a relationship bank acquires superior information not upon its first contact with a borrower, but through repeated interactions during the prolonged relationship. This assumption is motivated by the evidence in James (1987) and especially Lummer and McConnell (1989), who find no abnormal returns to the announcement of new loans, but strong abnormal returns associated with loan renewals.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, renewals with favorable (unfavorable) terms have positive

\textsuperscript{31}Slovin et al. (1992), Best and Zhang (1993), and Billett et al. (1995) document positive and significant price reactions to both loan initiation and renewal announcements.
(negative) abnormal returns, suggesting the importance of asymmetric information.\footnote{More recently, Botsch and Vanasco (2019) provide evidence that loan contract terms change over time as banks learn about borrowers. In particular, relationship lending benefits are heterogeneous, with higher-quality borrowers experiencing declining prices and lower-quality borrowers experiencing increasing prices and declining credit supply. This evidence is consistent with our key assumption that a relationship bank acquires superior information through repeated transactions with the borrower.}

Our result on zombie lending implies that \textit{as the lending relationship continues, renewals should gradually contain more favorable terms, but the positive abnormal returns will shrink.} The result on efficient liquidation predicts \textit{the age distribution of liquidated loans is left-skewed.}\footnote{In practice, bank loans are often secured. It is widely believed that lenders obtain more bargaining power upon seizing the asset and push for liquidation. See Benmelech et al. (2020) and the citation therein.}

Zombie Lending

A central result of our model is that relationship banks conduct zombie lending to cover negative private information, so that they can offload these loans to other lenders in the near future. These other lenders can be non-bank institutions or other banks with funding advantages. The most direct evidence for this channel is presented by Gande et al. (1997), who study debt underwriting by commercial banks and investment houses. They show that when debt securities are issued for purposes other than repaying existing bank debt, the yield spreads are reduced by 42 basis points if underwritten by commercial banks. Interestingly, when the stated purpose is to refinance existing bank debt, there is no statistical significance between yield spreads on debt issues underwritten by commercial banks and investment houses.

Besides, some anecdotal evidence also suggests the channel highlighted in our paper. An example is Horizon Bank in Washington, which failed in 2010. According to its Material Loss Review, Horizon Bank frequently renewed, extended, or modified its large relationship loans without taking adequate steps to ensure the borrower had the capacity to repay the loan. Loan files often cited refinancing as the sole exit strategy in the event of problems (pp. 7 and 9 in \textit{FDIC (2010)}). In practice, many troubled loans are eventually refinanced by others, which in some cases even causes the failure of the banks who buy these loans. An example is FirstCity Bank of Stockbridge in Georgia, which failed in 2009. According to its Material Loss Review, the bank had adopted inadequate loan policies, and no analysis was made of possible liquidation values in the event a project did not perform (p. 6 of \textit{FDIC (2009)}). The Gordon Bank in Georgia, which purchased many loan participations from FirstCity without performing adequate due diligence,\footnote{Loan participation is defined as the transfer of an undivided interest in all or part of the principle amount of a loan from a seller, known as the “lead,” to a buyer, known as the “participant,” without recourse to the lead, pursuant to an agreement between the lead and the participant. “Without recourse” means the loan participation is not subject to any agreement that requires the lead to repurchase the participant’s interest or to otherwise compensate the participant upon the borrower’s default on the underlying loan.}
subsequently failed in 2011 (FDIC, 2011). Relatedly, Giannetti et al. (2017) show that for low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders, a relationship bank upgrades its private credit rating about the borrower in order to avoid other lenders cutting credit and thus impairing the borrower’s ability to repay loans.35

**Market Financing**

Our model’s market-financing stage can be interpreted in various ways. The most direct interpretation is debt initial public offering. Datta et al. (2000) show that initial public debt offering has a negative stock price effect, and the effect is stronger for younger firms. Our model with exogenous breakup is consistent this pattern (Panel 5c of Figure 5). Early on, only bad projects are voluntarily refinanced with the market without lending-relationship breakups. Only during later stages do the good and uninformed types start to voluntarily refinance with the market as well. A complementary hypothesis that remains untested is that the announcement effect of loan renewals preceding public debt issuance (or loan sales) should be small or even zero. An alternative interpretation of market financing is a credit-rating upgrade from speculative to investment bucket, which, as shown by Rauh and Sufi (2010), leads to firms heavily shifting away from bank loans to bonds. Our model predicts relationship banks are more likely to conduct zombie lending before debt initial public offerings and anticipated rating upgrades. Potentially, one can test whether covenant violations lead to less harsh outcomes during these periods.

More broadly, the market-financing stage can be interpreted as loan sales and securitization.36 In our model, two kinds of loans may be sold: (1) bad loans that banks try to offload, and (2) good loans for which the borrowers seek cheaper credit in order to relax their borrowing constraints. Indeed, existing evidence on loan sales and loan quality is mixed. Dahiya et al. (2003) find negative-announcement effects on loan sales, and almost half of the borrowers later filed for bankruptcy. Interestingly, these firms are not the worst-performing firms at the time of loan sales, based on public information such as return on assets, investment, and leverage, suggesting negative private information contained in loan sales. By contrast, Drucker and Puri (2009) find that sold loans did not decline in quality. Gande and Saunders (2012) find that a borrowing firm’s stock price experiences a positive increase on the first day of its loan being traded in the secondary market, driven by the relaxed financial constraint.37 As acknowledged by Gande and Saunders (2012), in the sample of Dahiya et al. (2003), most original lenders terminated the lending relationships after the loan sales. Existing studies have documented more dubious loans being originated (Keys et al., 2010; Bord and Santos, 2015) under securi-

35They also show relationship banks strategically downgrade high-quality borrowers’ ratings.
36Note we do not model the security-design problem.
37Also see Jiang et al. (2013), who show that loans remaining on a lender’s balance sheet ex post have higher delinquency rates than those sold. Their explanation is different though.
ritization, such as CLOs and CDOs. Our paper predicts that as the financial market develops with the rise of securitization and loan sales (or, equivalently, an improvement in bond-market liquidity), zombie lending can be a more secular phenomenon. Potentially, one can verify this pattern using either cross-sectional or time-series data.

V. Concluding Remarks

This paper offers a novel explanation for the prevalent phenomenon of zombie lending. In particular, we introduce private learning into a banking model and argue that in a dynamic lending relationship, zombie lending is inevitable but self-limiting. We show how the length of the zombie-lending period is affected by various factors such as the cost of bank and market financing, as well as the entrepreneur’s financial constraint. Moreover, we show that in the dynamic lending relationship, the bank has incentives to under-supply its effort in producing information.

Our key insights are robust to alternative assumptions. In practice, information about the borrower’s quality probably arrives in multiple rounds and is imperfect during each round. The key insights will go through under this alternative assumption. In our model, the entrepreneur and the bank have incentives to conduct zombie lending if they know with certainty that the project is bad. If, instead, they know the project is likely to be bad (but not with certainty), the cost of rolling over bad loans would be lower, so the incentives to conduct zombie lending should be even stronger. Moreover, even though we do not directly model collateral, \( L \), the liquidation value of the project, can be interpreted as the collateral value that is redeployed for alternative uses (Benmelech, 2009). Kermani and Ma (2020) estimate the liquidation recovery rates of assets among US non-financial firms across industries. In particular, one can think of \( R - L \) as the additional cash flows generated if the project succeeds, and if the project fails, we assume the collateral value is wiped out. In this sense, the intuition of zombie lending carries over once we introduce the role of collaterals. In fact, our results will go through under weaker assumptions, for instance, if we assume the project generates no cash flows if it fails, but the collateral value also falls to \( \xi L > 0 \), where \( \xi \in (0, 1) \). For \( \xi \) sufficiently small, all our results should carry over. Finally, our extension with exogenous lending-relationship breakups can be broadly interpreted as shocks to bank capital (Parlour and Plantin, 2008). Results in subsection A show the key insights will carry over if bank equity is introduced.

Zombie lending emerges in our paper due to the substitution between the relationship bank and market-based lenders. An interesting extension is to introduce complementarity between banks and the market as in Song and Thakor (2010). Moreover, we have not explicitly modeled interbank competition (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Interbank competi-

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38Benmelech et al. (2012) and Begley and Purnanandam (2017) find the opposite results during a different time period.
tion does not change any result in the context of our model, because the new bank is as uninformed as market-based lenders. Studying the tradeoffs of developing multiple lending relationships would be interesting. As documented by Farinha and Santos (2002), a young firm could initiate multiple relationships, because the incumbent bank is unwilling to extend credit after poor performance.
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F. Appendix

A. Proofs

Let us first supplement the definition for the good and bad types’ value functions.

\[
V^g_t = \max_{\tau^g \geq t, \text{ s.t. } B^g_{\tau^g} \geq L} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \int_t^{\tau^g} e^{-r(s-t)} ds + e^{-r(\tau^g-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^g \geq \tau_g} R + 1_{\tau^g < \tau_g} \max \{ L, \tilde{V}^g_{\tau^g} \} \right] \right\}
\]

\[
V^b_t = \max_{\tau^b \geq t, \text{ s.t. } B^b_{\tau^b} \geq L} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \int_t^{\tau^b} e^{-r(s-t)} ds + e^{-r(\tau^b-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^b \geq \tau_g} \theta R + 1_{\tau^b \geq \tau_g} \cdot 0 \right] + 1_{\tau^b < \min \{ \tau_g, \tau_g \}} \max \{ L, \min \{ \tilde{V}^b_{\tau^b}, F \} \} \right\}
\]

\[
B^g_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \int_t^{\tau^g} e^{-r(s-t)} ds + e^{-r(\tau^g-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^g \geq \tau_g} F + 1_{\tau^g < \tau_g} \max \{ L, \min \{ \tilde{V}^g_{\tau^g}, F \} \} \right] \right\}
\]

\[
B^b_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \int_t^{\tau^b} e^{-r(s-t)} ds + e^{-r(\tau^b-t)} \left[ 1_{\tau^b \geq \tau_g} \theta F + 1_{\tau^b \geq \tau_g} 0 \right] + 1_{\tau^b < \min \{ \tau_g, \tau_g \}} \max \{ L, \min \{ \tilde{V}^b_{\tau^b}, F \} \} \right\}
\]

A.1. Proof of Proposition 2

Let us first prove the No Deals condition and belief monotonicity requirement imply smooth pasting at \( t = t_g \). That is,

\[
\dot{V}^g_{t_g} = \dot{D}_t = \dot{q}_t (D^g - D^b).
\]

The proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Daley and Green (2012). No Deals and value matching condition immediately implies that \( \dot{V}^g_{t_g} \leq \dot{D}_t = \dot{q}_t (D^g - D^b) \). Suppose that \( \dot{V}^g_{t_g} < \dot{q}_t (D^g - D^b) \) instead. In this case, consider a deviation in which the good types wait until \( t_g + \epsilon \) to refinance with the market, where \( \epsilon \) is sufficiently small. Belief monotonicity implies that \( q_{t_g + \epsilon} \) is at least (approximately) \( q_{t_g} + \eta q_{t_g} (1 - q_{t_g}) \epsilon \), which shows that the good types have strict incentives to wait until \( t_g + \epsilon \).

By applying the smooth pasting and value matching conditions for the type \( g \) at the market financing time \( t = t_g \) we get

\[
\dot{V}^g_t = (D^g - D^b) \eta q_t (1 - q_t).
\]
Using the HJB for the type $g$ during $[t_b, t_g]$, and letting $\bar{q} = q_{t_g}$,

$$(r + \phi) V^g_t = \dot{V}^g_t + c + \phi R$$

$$\Rightarrow \phi (R - F) + (r + \phi) \left[ \bar{q} D^g + (1 - \bar{q}) D^b \right] = (D^g - D^b) \eta \bar{q} (1 - \bar{q}) + c + \phi R.$$ 

Next, we show that given the Assumption 4 there is only one root on $[0, 1]$, which corresponds to the maximal root of the quadratic equation. First, we evaluate $LHS - RHS$ at $\bar{q} = 0$:

$$(r + \phi) \left( D^b - \frac{\delta + \phi}{r + \phi} D^g \right) < 0.$$ 

Next, we evaluate $LHS - RHS$ at $\bar{q} = 1$:

$$(r + \phi) \left( D^g - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) = (r + \phi) \left( \frac{c + \phi F}{\delta + \phi} - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) > 0.$$ 

So we can conclude that there is only one root on $[0, 1]$. Next, we rewrite the quadratic equation for $\bar{q}$ as

$$\bar{q}^2 - \left( 1 - \frac{r + \phi}{\eta} \right) \bar{q} + \frac{r + \phi}{\eta} \left( \frac{D^b}{D^g - D^b} - \frac{\delta + \phi}{r + \phi} \frac{D^b}{D^g - D^b} \right) = 0.$$ 

Note: the minimum of the quadratic function is attained at

$$q_{\text{min}}^\text{opt} \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{r + \phi}{\eta} \right),$$ 

and that $\bar{q} > q_{\text{min}}^\text{opt}$. We will use the observation that $\bar{q} > q_{\text{min}}^\text{opt}$ later to verify the optimality decisions by different types in equilibrium.

The next step is to solve for the length of $t_g - t_b$. Let

$$\bar{D} = \bar{q} D^g + (1 - \bar{q}) D^b,$$

and

$$\bar{V}^b_{t_g} = \bar{D} + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta}.$$ 

Using the boundary condition for the bad type at time $t_b$, $V^b_{t_b} = L$, together with the type-$b$’s HJB equation on $[t_b, t_g]$:

$$(r + \phi + \eta) V^b_t = \dot{V}^b_t + c + \phi \theta R.$$
we obtain the equation
\[ t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi + \eta} \log \left( \frac{V^b_t - PV^b_r}{L - PV^b_r} \right). \]

From here, we can find \( t_b \) using the equation
\[ \bar{q} = \frac{q_0}{q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-(\lambda + \eta)t_b}e^{-\eta(t_g - t_b)}}, \]
which yields
\[ t_b = \frac{1}{\lambda + \eta} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1 - q_0}{q_0} \frac{\bar{q}}{1 - \bar{q}} \right) - \eta(t_g - t_b) \right]. \]

**Optimality the Good Type’s Strategy.** We need to verify that it is indeed optimal for the type \( g \) to obtain market financing at time \( t_g \). The HJB equation for the high type on \([0, t_g)\).
\[ (r + \phi)V^g_t = \dot{V}^g_t + c + \phi R. \]

To verify that it is not optimal to delay market financing, we need to verify that the following inequality holds for any \( t > t_g \)
\[ (r + \phi)V^g_t \geq \dot{V}^g_t + c + \phi R. \]

On the other hand, to verify that it is not optimal for the good type to seek market financing before time \( t_g \), we need to verify that for any \( t < t_g \),
\[ V^g_t \geq \tilde{V}^g_t. \]

Next, we proceed to verify each of these inequalities. First, we verify the optimality for \( t \geq t_g \). Let’s define
\[ G_t = (r + \phi)V^g_t - \dot{V}^g_t - c - \phi R \]
\[ = (r + \phi)\left( D_t + \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) - \dot{D}_t - c - \phi R \]
\[ = (r + \phi)D_t - \dot{D}_t - c - \phi F \]

By construction, \( G_{t_g} = 0 \) so it is enough to show that \( \dot{G}_t \geq 0 \) for \( t > t_g \). This amounts to verify that
\[ \dot{G}_t = (r + \phi)\dot{D}_t - \ddot{D}_t \geq 0 \]

Substituting the expressions for \( D_t \), we get
\[ \dot{G}_t = (D^g - D^b) \left[ (r + \phi)\dot{q}_t - \ddot{q}_t \right]. \]
In the last region where \( t \geq t_g \), we have \( \dot{q}_t = \eta q_t (1 - q_t) \) so we get that

\[
\dot{G}_t = (D^g - D^b) [r + \phi - \eta(1 - 2q_t)] \dot{q}_t.
\]

The conclusion that \( \dot{G}_t > 0 \) follows from the inequality \( \bar{q} > q_{\text{min}} \), where \( q_{\text{min}} \) is defined in equation (F.1). Next, we verify the optimality for \( t < t_g \). Let’s define \( H_t \equiv V_t^g - \bar{V}_t^g \).

The first step is to show that \( H_t \) single crosses zero from above. We have that

\[
\dot{H}_t = (r + \phi)V_t^g - c - \phi R - (D^g - D^b) \dot{q}_t
\]

\[
= (r + \phi)H_t + (r + \phi)\bar{V}_t^g - c - \phi R - (D^g - D^b) \dot{q}_t.
\]

Hence, a sufficient condition is

\[
\dot{H}_t \bigg|_{H_t=0} = (r + \phi)\bar{V}_t^g - c - \phi R - (D^g - D^b) \dot{q}_t < 0
\]

on \((0, t_g)\), which requires that

\[
(r + \phi)[q_t D^g + (1 - q_t) D^b] < (D^g - D^b) \dot{q}_t + c + \phi F.
\]

Since we have that \( \dot{q}_t \geq \eta q_t (1 - q_t) \) and \( \bar{q} > q_{\text{min}} \), it follows that

\[
(r + \phi)[q D^g + (1 - q) D^b] < (D^g - D^b) \eta q (1 - q) + c + \phi F,
\]

for all \( 0 < q < \bar{q} \), which means that \( \dot{H}_t \bigg|_{H_t=0} < 0 \) for \( t < t_g \). From here we can conclude that \( V_t^g \geq \bar{V}_t^g \) for \( t < t_g \).

**Optimality of the Bad Type’s Strategy.** The strategy of the low type is optimal if for any \( t < t_b \), \( (r + \phi + \eta) L \geq c + \phi R \Rightarrow L \geq PV_t^b \), and for any \( t \geq t_b \), \( V_t^b \geq L \). To verify that \( V_t^b \geq L \) for \( t > t_b \), notice that on \((t_b, t_g)\), the value function satisfies

\[
(r + \phi + \eta) V_t^b = \dot{V}_t^b + c + \phi R.
\]

This equation can be written as

\[
(r + \phi + \eta) (V_t^b - L) = \dot{V}_t^b + c + \phi R - (r + \phi + \eta) L.
\]

Letting \( G_t = V_t^b - L \), we obtain the equation

\[
\dot{G}_t = (r + \phi + \eta) (G_t + L - PV_t^b), \quad G_{t_b} = 0.
\]
Clearly, $\dot{G}_t|_{G_t=0} > 0$ so that $G_t = V!^b - L \geq 0$ for all $t \geq t_b$.

**Optimality of the Uninformed Type’s Strategy.** Next, we verify that the uninformed is better off rolling over at time $t < t_b$ rather than liquidating. First, we solve for the continuation value of the uninformed at any time $t < t_b$. For $t \in (0, t_b)$, we have that

\[
(r + \phi + \lambda + (1 - \mu_t)\eta) \dot{V}^u_t = \dot{V}^u_t + c + \phi [\mu_t + (1 - \mu_t) \theta] R + \lambda [\mu_t V^g_t + (1 - \mu_t) L]
\]

\[
(r + \phi) V^g_t = \dot{V}^g_t + c + \phi R.
\]

Solving backward starting at time $t_b$ we get

\[
V^u_t = \int_t^{t_b} e^{-(r+\phi+\lambda)(s-t)-\int_s^t \eta(1-\mu_u)du} (c + \phi [\mu_s + (1 - \mu_s) \theta] R + \lambda [\mu_s V^g_s + (1 - \mu_s) L]) ds
\]

\[
+ e^{-(r+\phi+\lambda)(t_b-t)-\int_{t_b}^t \eta(1-\mu_u)du} V^u_{t_b}
\]

Substituting the relation

\[
\int_s^t \eta(1-\mu_u)du = \int_t^s \frac{\mu_s}{\mu_t} ds = \log(\mu_s/\mu_t),
\]

and the continuation value of the good type

\[
V^g_t = \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi} \left(1 - e^{-(r+\phi)(t_b-t)}\right) + e^{-(r+\phi)(t_b-t)} V^g_{t_b},
\]

we obtain

\[
V^u_t = \mu_t \left[ PV^g_t + e^{-(r+\phi)(t_b-t)} \left(V^g_{t_b} - PV^g_r\right) \right]
\]

\[
+ (1 - \mu_t) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} + e^{-(r+\phi+\lambda+\eta)(t_b-t)} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \right) \right].
\]  

(F.2)

It is convenient to express the continuation value of the uninformed in terms of the uninformed’s belief $\mu_t$. Let $t(\mu) = -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{\eta_0}{1-\eta_0} \frac{1-\mu}{\mu} \right)$ be the time at which the belief is $\mu$, which is given by Let $\mu_b$ be given by $t(\mu_b) = t_b$ so

\[
t(\mu_b) - t(\mu) = -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left( \frac{1-\mu_b}{\mu_b} \frac{\mu}{1-\mu} \right).
\]
Substituting $t(\mu_b) - t(\mu)$ we get

$$V^u(\mu) = \mu \left[ PV^g_r + \left( \frac{1 - \mu_b}{\mu_b} \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \right)^{r + \phi \eta} \left( V^g_{t_b} - PV^g_r \right) \right] + (1 - \mu) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} + \left( \frac{1 - \mu_b}{\mu_b} \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \right)^{1 + \frac{r + \phi + \lambda}{\eta}} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \right]. \tag{F.3}$$

Letting $z = \mu/(1 - \mu)$, we have that $V^u(\mu) \geq L$ if

$$z \left[ PV^g_r - L + \frac{(z)^{r + \phi \eta}}{z_b} (V^g_{t_b} - PV^g_r) \right] - \frac{r + \phi + \eta}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z}{z_b} \right)^{1 + \frac{r + \phi + \lambda}{\eta}} \right] \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) > 0.$$ 

The LHS is increasing in $z$ (so $V^u(\mu)$ is increasing in $\mu$), hence $V^u(\mu) \geq L$ for all $\mu \in [q_0, \mu_b]$ only if $V^u(q_0) \geq L$.

**No Deals for the Uninformed.** Finally, we need to verify that the no deals condition holds for the uninformed type. This is immediate when $\eta = 0$, but requires verification when $\eta > 0$. No deals requires that

$$V^u_t \geq \hat{D}_t + \mu_t \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} + (1 - \mu_t) \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta},$$

where $\hat{D}_t$ is the value of debt if the uninformed is pooled with the bad type. In particular,

$$\hat{D}_t = \hat{q}_t D^g + (1 - \hat{q}_t) D^b,$$

where $\hat{q}_t$ is the beliefs conditional on being either uninformed or bad. For $t < t_b$, the probability of being bad is zero so the probability of the project being good conditional on being either bad or uninformed is given by

$$\hat{q}_t = \mu_t = \frac{q_0}{q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-\eta t}}.$$

For $t \in (t_b, t_g)$ we gave

$$\hat{q}_t = \mu_t = \frac{\pi^u_t}{1 - \pi^g_t}$$

where

$$\pi^u_t = \frac{(q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-\eta t}) e^{-\lambda t}}{q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-(\lambda + \eta) t_b} e^{-\eta (t - t_b)}}$$

$$\pi^g_t = \frac{q_0(1 - e^{-\lambda t})}{q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-(\lambda + \eta) t_b} e^{-\eta (t - t_b)}}$$

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so
\[
\frac{\pi_t^u}{1 - \pi_t^g} = \frac{(q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-\eta t})e^{-\lambda t}}{q_0e^{-\lambda t} + (1 - q_0)e^{-(\lambda + \eta) t} e^{-\eta(t - t_b)}}
\]
and
\[
\tilde{q}_t = \frac{q_0 e^{-\lambda t}}{q_0 e^{-\lambda t} + (1 - q_0) e^{-(\lambda + \eta) t} e^{-\eta(t - t_b)}} = \frac{q_0}{q_0 + (1 - q_0) e^{-\lambda t} e^{(\lambda - \eta)t}}.
\]
From here we get that \( \tilde{D}_t \) is decreasing in time only if \( \lambda > \eta \). For any \( t \in [t_b, t_g] \), the continuation value for the uninformed is given by
\[
V^u_t = \mu_t V^g_t + (1 - \mu_t) V^b_t.
\]
So the no-deals condition on \((t_b, t_g)\) can be written as
\[
\mu_t \left( V^g_t - \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_t) \left( V^b_t - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) \geq \tilde{D}_t,
\]
where the LHS is increasing in \( t \).

Claim 1:
\[
\mu_t \left( V^g_t - \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_t) \left( V^b_t - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right)
\]
is increasing in time.

Proof. To show that the expression in the proposition is increasing in time, it is sufficient to show that
\[
V^g_t - V^b_t \geq \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta}.
\]
At time \( t_g \) we have
\[
V^g_{t_g} - V^b_{t_g} = \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta},
\]
while at any time \( t < t_g \) we have
\[
\dot{V}^g_t - \dot{V}^b_t = (r + \phi)(V^g_t - V^b_t) - \eta V^b_t - \phi(1 - \theta) R.
\]
Solving backward in time starting at \( t_g \) we get
\[
V^g_t - V^b_t = \frac{\eta}{r + \phi} \frac{c + \phi R}{r + \phi + \eta} \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \right) + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \left( 1 - e^{-\eta(t_g - t)} \right) \left( V^b_{t_g} - \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) + \frac{\phi(1 - \theta) R}{r + \phi} \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \right) + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \left( \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right). \]
Hence, we get that
\[
V^g_t - V^b_t - \left( \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) = e^{-(r+\phi)(t\gamma^{-1})} \left( 1 - e^{-\eta(t\gamma^{-1})} \right) \left( V^b_{t\gamma} - \frac{c + \phi\theta R}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) + \frac{(1 - e^{-(r+\phi)(t\gamma^{-1})})}{r + \phi + \eta} \left( \frac{\eta e^{(1 - \theta)F} + \eta}{r + \phi + \phi F} \right) > 0.
\]

It follows immediately from the fact that $\mu_t$, $V^b_t$, and $V^g_t$ are increasing in time that
\[
\mu_t \left( V^g_t - \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_t) \left( V^b_t - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right)
\]
is also increasing in time.

If $\lambda > \eta$, then the previous claim implies that it enough to verify the uninformed no deal’s condition at time $t_b$ to guarantee that it is satisfied for all $t \in [t_b, t_g]$. In which case, we only need to verify that

\[
\mu_{t_b} \left( V^g_{t_b} - \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_{t_b}) \left( L - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) \geq \tilde{D}_{t_b}. \tag{F.4}
\]

At time $t_b$, we have that
\[
\bar{q}_{t_b} = \frac{q_0}{q_0 + (1 - q_0) e^{-\mu_{t_b}}} = \mu_{t_b},
\]
thus, we can write condition (F.4) as

\[
\mu_{t_b} \left( V^g_{t_b} - D^g - \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_{t_b}) \left( L - D^b - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) \geq 0. \tag{F.5}
\]

Therefore, we are only left to verify No Deals on $t \in [0, t_b]$. Because $\bar{q}_t = \mu_t$ on $(0, t_b)$, the no-deals condition for the uninformed on $(0, t_b)$ condition amounts to verify that

\[
V^u_t \geq \mu_t \left( D^g + \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) + (1 - \mu_t) \left( D^b + \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} \right).
\]

Using equation (F.3), we can write the uninformed’s no-deal condition as

\[
F(z) \equiv z \left( \frac{z^{r + \phi + \lambda}}{\eta^{2}} \right) \left( V^g_{t_b} - PV^g_{t_b} \right) + \left( z \frac{z^{1 + r + \phi + \lambda}}{\eta^{2}} \right) \left( L - \frac{c + \phi\theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \right)
\]
\[
- z \left( D^g + \frac{\phi(R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_{t_b} \right) + \frac{c + \phi\theta R + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} - \frac{\phi\theta(R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} - D^b \geq 0.
\]
It can be easily verified that $F(z)$ is convex and that its first derivate is given by

$$F'(z) = \left(1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\eta}\right) \left(\frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{\eta}} \left[(V_{tb}^g - PV_{tr}^g) + \frac{1}{z_b} (L - PV_b^b)\right]$$

$$- \left(D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV_r^g\right).$$

To verify the no-deals condition we need to consider the case in which the minimum of $F(z)$ is on the boundary of $[z_0, z_b]$ and the case in which it is in the interior. Because $F(z)$ is convex, the previous three cases correspond to: 1) if $F'(z_0) \geq 0$, then $F$ is increasing on $[z_0, z_b]$ so it is sufficient to check that $F(z_0) \geq 0$; 2) if $F'(z_b) \leq 0$, then $F(z)$ is decreasing on $[z_0, z_b]$ so it is sufficient to check that $F(z_b) \geq 0$; and 3) if $F'(z_0) < 0 < F'(z_b)$, then $F$ attains its minimum at $z_{\text{min}}$ in the interior of $[z_0, z_b]$, and we need to verify that $F(z_{\text{min}}) \geq 0$. Notice that $F'(z) > 0$ when $\eta \to 0$, so for $\eta$ sufficiently small, the uninformed no deals condition reduces to $F(z_0) \geq 0$.

Case 1: $F'(z_0) \geq 0$. This is the case when

$$\left(\frac{z_0}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{\eta}} \geq \frac{\eta}{r + \phi + \eta} \left(D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV_r^g\right).$$

On the other hand, if $F'(z_0) \geq 0$, then the uninformed no deals condition is satisfied if $F(z_0) \geq 0$. $F'(z_0) \geq 0$ if

$$\left(\frac{z_0}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{\eta}} > \frac{\eta}{r + \phi + \eta} \left(D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV_r^g\right).$$

In this case, the uninformed’s no-deals condition is

$$\left(\frac{z_0}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{\eta}} (V_{tb}^g - PV_{tr}^g) + \left[\left(\frac{z_0}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r+\phi+\lambda}{\eta}} - 1\right] \frac{r + \phi + \eta}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} (L - PV_{tr}^b) \geq$$

$$z_0 \left(D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV_r^g\right) + D^b + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} - L,$$

which holds for $\eta$ sufficiently small. This condition is captured by $\eta < \bar{\eta}$.

For completeness, we also list the conditions for the other two cases. Note that for $\eta$ sufficiently small, these two cases will not show up.
Case 2: \( F'(z_b) \leq 0 \). This is the case when 
\[
1 \leq \frac{\eta}{r + \phi + \eta} \left( D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_r \right)
\]
If the previous inequality is satisfied, the uninformed no-deals condition reduces to 
\( F(z_b) \geq 0 \), which can be written as 
\[
V^g_{tb} - PV^g_r \geq z_b \left( D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_r \right) + D^b + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi + \eta} - L.
\]

Case 3: \( F'(z_0) < 0 < F'(z_b) \) Finally, if 
\[
(\frac{z_0}{z_b})^{\frac{\phi}{r+\phi}} < \frac{\eta}{r + \phi + \eta} \left( D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_r \right)
\]
then, \( F(z) \) attains its minimum in the interior of \( (z_0, z_b) \), and we need to check the no-deals condition at its minimize. Solving for the first order condition, we find that 
\( z_{\text{min}} = \arg \min_z F(z) \) is 
\[
\left( \frac{z_{\text{min}}}{z_b} \right) = \left[ \frac{\eta}{1 + \frac{r+\phi}{\phi}} \left( V^g_{tb} - PV^g_r \right) \right] \left( \frac{D^g + \frac{\phi (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_r}{1 + \frac{r+\phi}{\phi}} \right)
\]
Substituting \( z_{\text{min}} \) in \( F(z) \) we find that the no-deals condition for the uninformed in this case is 
\[
\frac{(r + \phi) \left( V^g_{tb} - PV^g_r \right) - \frac{(r+\phi+\lambda)}{r+\phi+\lambda+\eta} \frac{1}{z_b} \left( L - PV^b_r \right)}{(1 + \frac{r+\phi}{\phi})^{\frac{\phi}{r+\phi}} \left( \frac{V^g_{tb} - PV^g_r}{z_b} \right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{r+\phi}} + \frac{L}{z_b} PV^b_r} \geq \frac{\eta}{z_b} \left( D^g + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi} \right) \left( D^g + \frac{\phi \theta (R - F)}{r + \phi} - PV^g_r \right)^{\frac{r+\phi}{r+\phi}}.
\]

A.2. Proof of Proposition 3

The financial constraint is only relevant for the rollover decision. The bank will be willing to rollover only if \( B^b_t \geq L \). In the equilibrium without the financial constraint, \( B^b_{t_b} < V^b_{t_b} = L \). Hence, in the presence of the financial constraint, the boundary condition for \( t_b \) is replaced by \( B^b_{t_b} \). By direct computation, we get that the bank’s continuation value at time \( t_b \) is given by 
\[
B^b_{t_b} = \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \eta} \left( 1 - e^{-(r+\phi+\eta)(t_g-t_b)} \right) + e^{-(r+\phi+\eta)(t_g-t_b)} F
\]
Solving the boundary condition $B_{t_b}^b = L$ we get

$$t_g - t_b = \frac{1}{r + \phi + \eta} \log \left( \frac{F - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \eta}}{L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \eta}} \right).$$

The No-Deals conditions for the good and uninformed type are the same as the unconstrained case. Hence, the only step left is to analyze the optimality of the rollover strategy. First, we look at the problem of the low type. In this case, we need to verify that $B_{t}^b \geq L$ for $t > t_b$, and that it is not optimal to delay liquidation before time $t_b$. To verify that $B_{t}^b \geq L$ on $(t_b, t_g)$, notice that

$$(r + \phi + \eta) B_{t}^b = \dot{B}_{t}^b + c + \phi \theta F,$$

so it follows

$$\dot{B}_{t}^b \bigg|_{B_{t}^b = L} = (r + \phi + \eta) \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \eta} \right) > (r + \phi + \eta) (L - PV_{t}^b) > 0,$$

which immediately implies that $B_{t}^b \geq L$ for $t > t_b$. To verify that it is not optimal to delay liquidation on $(0, t_b)$, notice that

$$\dot{B}_{t}^b = c + \phi \theta F - (r + \phi + \eta) B_{t}^b = c + \phi \theta F - (r + \phi + \eta) L < 0,$$

which implies that it is optimal to liquidate for $t < t_b$.

Next, we need to verify that the uninformed is willing to rollover the loan at time $t \in (0, t_b)$. The continuation value the uninformed satisfies the equation

$$(r + \phi + \lambda + (1 - \mu_t) \eta) B_{t}^u = \dot{B}_{t}^u + c + \phi \left[ \mu_t + (1 - \mu_t) \theta \right] F + \lambda \left[ \mu_t B_{t}^g + (1 - \mu_t) L \right]$$

$$= (r + \phi) B_{t}^g = \dot{B}_{t}^g + c + \phi F.$$

Solving backward in time starting at $t_b$, we get that for any $t \in [0, t_b]$, the uninformed continuation value is

$$B_{t}^u = \mu_t \left[ \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_b - t)} \left( B_{t_b}^g - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) \right]$$

$$+ (1 - \mu_t) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} + e^{-(r + \phi + \lambda + \eta)(t_b - t)} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \right) \right].$$

(F.6)
Let us rewrite $B^u_i$ in the belief domain:

\[
B^u(\mu) = \mu \left[ \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + \left( \frac{1 - \mu_b}{\mu_b} \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \right) \frac{r + \phi}{\mu} \left( B^g_{tb} - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) \right] \\
+ (1 - \mu) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} + \left( \frac{1 - \mu_b}{\mu_b} \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \right)^{1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\eta}} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \right) \right].
\] (F.7)

The condition $B^u_i \geq L$ can be written in terms of the likelihood ratio $z \equiv \mu/(1 - \mu)$ as

\[
z \left[ \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} - L + \left( \frac{z}{z_b} \right)^{\frac{r + \phi}{\eta}} \left( B^g_{tb} - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right) \right] \\
- \frac{r + \phi + \eta}{r + \phi + \lambda + \eta} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z}{z_b} \right)^{1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\eta}} \right] \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \geq 0.
\]

The left hand side is increasing in $z$, so it is enough to verify that $B^u_0 \geq L$.

**A.3. Proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 3**

*Proof.* The result on $\bar{q}$ naturally follows by plugging $\eta = 0$ into Proposition 2 and 3. The result on $\bar{q}$ and $t_g - t_b$ follow from Assumption 1 and 4.

**A.4. Proof of Proposition 5**

*Proof.* Given the boundary conditions, we can show that

\[
B^g_{tb} = \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t_b)} \left( F - \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} \right),
\]

whereas $B^b_{tb} = L$. When $t \in [0, t_b]$, the HJB satisfies

\[
(r + \phi + \lambda) B^u_t = \dot{B}^u_t + c + \phi \left[ q_0 + (1 - q_0) \theta \right] F + \lambda \left[ q_0 B^g_t + (1 - q_0) L \right].
\]

Solving this ODE, we can write $B^u_0$ in terms of primitives

\[
B^u_0 = q_0 \left[ \frac{c + \phi F}{r + \phi} + \left( \frac{1 - \bar{q}}{\bar{q}} \frac{q_0}{1 - q_0} \right)^{\frac{r + \phi}{\lambda}} \left( \frac{L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi}}{F - \frac{c + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi}} \right) \frac{r F - c}{r + \phi} \right] \\
+ (1 - q_0) \left[ \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} + \left( \frac{1 - \bar{q}}{\bar{q}} \frac{q_0}{1 - q_0} \right)^{1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\lambda}} \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \right].
\]
Finally,

\[
\frac{dB_0^u}{d \bar{q}} = q_0 \frac{1 + \frac{1 - \bar{q}}{\lambda}}{(1 - q_0)^{-\frac{1 - \bar{q}}{\lambda}} \times \left( \frac{1 - \bar{q}}{q} \right)^{\frac{\bar{q} + \phi}{\lambda} - 1}} \times \left( \frac{L - c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \left( \frac{1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\lambda}}{1 - q} \right),
\]

which is positive if \( \left( L - c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L \right) \left( 1 + \frac{r + \phi}{\lambda} \right) > \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta F + \lambda L}{r + \phi + \lambda} \right) \frac{c - r F r + \phi}{r + \phi + \lambda}. \) Since \( \bar{q} \) increases with \( \delta, \) \( \frac{dB_0^u}{d \bar{q}} > 0 \) and equivalently \( \frac{dB_0^g}{d \delta} < 0 \) if \( \delta \) is sufficiently small, whereas \( \frac{dB_0^u}{d \delta} < 0 \) if \( \delta \) gets sufficiently large. 

\section*{A.5. Proof of Proposition 7 and Corollary 4}

We offer the proof for the case without the financial constraint. The proofs for the case with the financial constraint and Corollary 4 are available in the online appendix.

Define \( t_a \equiv \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( \frac{1 - \bar{q}}{1 - q_0} \right) \). The proof is divided in two parts. First, we show that the equilibrium can be characterized by three thresholds, \( \{t_a, t_b, t_g\} \), and then we derive equations determining \( \{t_a, t_b, t_g\} \).

Recall that the boundary conditions for \( t_b \) and \( t_g \) are determined by the informed type \( b \) and \( g \), so that endogenous learning will not affect the existence of the three equilibrium regions, as well as the boundary conditions. It only remains to determine the equilibrium learning policy by the uninformed type. The first step is to show that the bank never learns after time \( t_b \). The result on \( [t_g, \infty) \) is straightforward, so we will prove that there is no learning for \( t \in [t_b, t_g) \).

Define

\[
\Psi_t \equiv \int_t^{t_g} e^{-(r + \phi)(s-t)}-\int_t^{s} \lambda a_t d a_t d s,
\]

\[
\Gamma_t \equiv q_0 B_t^g + (1 - q_0) B_t^b - B_t^u
\]

Suppose that the bank learns during \( (t_b, t_g) \). For any \( t \in (t_a, t_g) \), the HJB equation is

\[
\left( r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} \right) B_t^u = \dot{B}_t^u + y_t F - \psi a_t + \phi [q_0 + (1 - q_0) \theta] F + \frac{1}{m} V_t^u + \lambda a_t \Gamma_t \tag{F.8a}
\]

\[
\left( r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} \right) B_t^g = \dot{B}_t^g + y_t F + \phi F + \frac{1}{m} V_t^g \tag{F.8b}
\]

\[
\left( r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} \right) B_t^b = \dot{B}_t^b + y_t F + \phi \theta F + \frac{1}{m} V_t^b. \tag{F.8c}
\]
The ODE for $\Gamma_t$ follows:

$$
(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} + \lambda a_t) \Gamma_t = \dot{\Gamma}_t + \psi a_t + \frac{1}{m}(q_0 V_t^a + (1 - q_0)V_t^b - V_t^u) = \dot{\Gamma}_t + \psi a_t + \frac{1}{m}\Psi_t,
$$

Since $\Gamma_{t_a} = 0$, it implies that $\lambda \Gamma_t \leq 0 < \psi$ for $\forall t \in [t_b, t_a]$. Therefore, the bank never learns on $t \in [t_b, t_a]$.

Next, we prove that if learning happens at all, then it must happen on $[0, t_a]$ for some $t_a < t_b$. Let $t_a = \sup\{t \leq t_b : \lambda \Gamma_t = \psi\}$. Noticing that $\Gamma_{t_b} = 0$, we can conclude that $t_a < t_b$. We want to show that the optimal policy is $a_t = 1_{t < t_a}$. Suppose not, then there is $t'_a$ such that $\lambda \Gamma_t < \psi$ on $(t'_a - \epsilon, t'_a)$. In particular, consider $t'_a = \sup\{t < t_a : \lambda \Gamma_t < \psi\}$.

Consider the regions $(t'_a, t_a)$, in this region, the bank’s HJB equation is

$$
\begin{align*}
(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}) B^a_t &= \dot{B}^a_t + y_t F + \phi[q_0 + (1 - q_0)R] F - \psi + \frac{1}{m}V_t^a + \lambda \Gamma_t \\
(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}) B^b_t &= \dot{B}^b_t + y_t F + \phi F + \frac{1}{m}V_t^b \\
(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}) B^u_t &= \dot{B}^u_t + y_t F + \phi \theta F + \frac{1}{m}L,
\end{align*}
$$

so

$$
\left(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} + \lambda\right) \Gamma_t = \dot{\Gamma}_t + \frac{1}{m}(q_0 V_t^a + (1 - q_0)H_t - V_t^u) + \psi \quad \text{(F.9)}
$$

Let $H_t \equiv (1 - q_0)L + q_0 V_t^a - V_t^u$, we get

$$
\left(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m} + \lambda\right) \Gamma_t = \dot{\Gamma}_t + \frac{1}{m}H_t + \psi, \quad t \in (t'_a, t_a)
$$

$$
\left(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}\right) \Gamma_t = \dot{\Gamma}_t + \frac{1}{m}H_t, \quad t \in (t_a, t_b).
$$

Taking the left and right limit at $t'_a$ we get $\dot{\Gamma}_{t_a^-} = \dot{\Gamma}_{t_a^+}$, so $\Gamma_t$ is differentiable at $t_a$. It follows from the ODE for $\Gamma_t$ that if $\dot{H}_t \leq 0$ on $(t'_a, t_b)$, then $\Gamma_t$ is a quasi-convex function of $t$ on $(t'_a, t_b)$. To show that $\dot{H}_t \leq 0$, we write an ODE for $H_t$ using the HJB equations for $V_t^a$ and $V_t^b$, which is given by

$$
(r + \phi + \lambda) H_t = \dot{H}_t + (r + \phi)(1 - q_0) L - (1 - q_0)(c + \phi \theta R) + \psi - \lambda (1 - q_0)(V_t^b - L), \quad t \in (t'_a, t_a) \quad \text{(F.10)}
$$

$$
(r + \phi) H_t = \dot{H}_t + (r + \phi)(1 - q_0)L - (1 - q_0)(c + \phi \theta R), \quad t \in (t_a, t_b), \quad \text{(F.11)}
$$

where $H_{t_b} = (1 - q_0)V_{t_b}^b + q_0 V_{t_b}^a - V_{t_b}^u = 0$. Assumption 1 implies that $\dot{H}_{t_b} < 0$. Differen-
tiating equation (F.11) and (F.12) we get

$$(r + \phi + \lambda) \dot{H}_t = \ddot{H}_t - \lambda (1 - q_0) \dot{V}_t^b, \ t \in (t'_a, t_a)$$

$$(r + \phi) \dot{H}_t = \ddot{H}_t, \ t \in (t_a, t_b).$$

It immediately follows that $\dot{H}_t = 0 \Rightarrow \ddot{H}_t \geq 0$ since $\dot{V}_t^b \geq 0$. Hence, $\dot{H}_t$ single crosses 0 from negative to positive, so $\dot{H}_t < 0 \Rightarrow \ddot{H}_t < 0, \forall t \in (t'_a, t_b)$.

Since, $\Gamma_t$ is quasi-convex on $(t'_a, t_b)$, $\Gamma_{t_b} = 0$ and $\Gamma_{t_a} = \psi/\lambda$. It must be the case that $\Gamma_{t'_a} > \psi/\lambda$, which provides the desired contractions. Thus, it must be the case that $\lambda \Gamma_t \geq \psi$ for all $t < t_a$

Having shown that the optimal policy is characterized by $\{t_a, t_b, t_g\}$, we provide a solution and derive parametric assumptions needed to validate it. Note that in the equilibrium characterized by $\{t_a, t_b, t_g\}$, beliefs evolve on $t \in (t_a, t_b)$ according to

$$\dot{\pi}_u^t = \frac{1}{m} \pi_u^t \dot{\pi}_b^t$$

$$\dot{\pi}_g^t = \frac{1}{m} \pi_g^t \dot{\pi}_b^t$$

$$\dot{\pi}_b^t = -\frac{1}{m} \pi_b^t (1 - \pi_b^t),$$

which means that the average quality evolves according to

$$\dot{q}_t = \frac{1}{m} q_t \pi_b^t.$$

Solving the previous equation starting at time $t_a$, we obtain that for any $t > t_a$ the average belief is

$$q_t = q_{t_a} e^{\frac{1}{m} \int_{t_a}^{t} \pi_b^s ds} \tag{F.13}$$

The differential equation for $\pi_b^t$ is decoupled from the one for $\pi_u^t$ and $\pi_g^t$ so it can be solved independently to get

$$\pi_b^t = \frac{\pi_b^{t_a}}{\pi_b^{t_a} + (1 - \pi_b^{t_a}) e^{\frac{1}{m} \int_{t_a}^{t} \pi_b^s ds}}\pi_b^{t_a}$$

$$e^{\frac{1}{m} \int_{t_a}^{t} \pi_b^s ds} = \frac{1 - \pi_b^{t_a}}{1 - \pi_b^{t_a}}.$$

Substituting in equation (F.13) we get

$$q_t = \frac{1}{1 - \pi_b^{t_a} + \pi_b^{t_a} e^{-\frac{1}{m} (t-t_a)} q_{t_a}}. \tag{F.14}$$
To find $\pi_{t_a}^b$, we use equations (F.14), (F.15), and (F.16) to get:

$$\pi_{t_a}^b = 1 - \frac{q_{t_a}}{q_0}(q_0 + (1 - q_0)e^{-\lambda t_a}).$$

Taking the limit of $q_t$ in equation (F.14) as $t \to \infty$ we get that $q_t \to \frac{q_{t_a}}{1 - \pi_{t_a}^b}$, so $\lim_{t \to \infty} q_t > \bar{q}$ only if

$$t_a \geq t_a \equiv \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{1 - \bar{q}} \frac{1 - q_0}{q_0}\right). \quad \text{(F.15)}$$

Having established a lower bound for $t_a$, we proceed to derive a system of equations for $t_a, t_b, t_g$. On $(t_a, t_b)$, the bank’s continuation value satisfies equation (F.8) evaluated at $a_t = 0$. We can solve for $\Gamma_t$ using the terminal condition $\Gamma_{t_b} = 0$ to get

$$\Gamma_t = \int_t^{t_b} e^{-(r + \phi + \frac{\lambda}{m})(s - t)} \frac{1}{m} [(1 - q_0)L + q_0 V_{s}^g - V_{t_a}^g] \, ds. \quad \text{(F.16)}$$

The continuation value of the good and the uninformed types can be solved in close form and are given by for $V_t^u$

$$q_0 V_{t_a}^g = \frac{q_0 c + q_0 \phi R}{r + \phi} (1 - e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)}) + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} q_0 V_{t_g}^g$$

$$V_{t_a}^u = \frac{c + \phi [q_0 + (1 - q_0) \theta] R}{r + \phi} (1 - e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)}) + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} V_{t_g}^u.$$ 

Thus, we get that

$$(1 - q_0)L + q_0 V_{t_a}^g - V_{t_a}^u = (1 - q_0) \left[ L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} (1 - e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)}) + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} (q_0 V_{t_g}^g - V_{t_g}^u) \right]$$

$$(1 - q_0) \left[ L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} + e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \left( \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} - V_{t_g}^b \right) \right]$$

Substituting in equation (F.16) we get

$$\Gamma_t = \frac{1}{m}(1 - q_0) \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} \right) \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi + \frac{\lambda}{m})(t_b - t)} \right) +$$

$$(1 - q_0) \left( \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} - V_{t_g}^b \right) e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t)} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{\lambda}{m}(t_b - t)} \right).$$

After substituting $V_{t_g}^b$, we get the following equation for $t_a$:

$$\frac{1}{m}(1 - q_0) \left( L - \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} \right) \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi + \frac{\lambda}{m})(t_b - t_a)} \right) +$$

$$(1 - q_0) \left( \frac{c + \phi \theta R}{r + \phi} - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \frac{1}{m} V_{t_g}^b}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \right) e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t_a)} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{\lambda}{m}(t_b - t_a)} \right) = \frac{\psi}{\lambda}. \quad \text{(F.17)}$$
Combining equations (F.17) and (F.14), together with the incentive compatibility condition determining \( t_g - t_b \) in equation (29), we obtain three equations to characterize the thresholds: \( \{ t_a, t_b, t_g \} \)

\[
\bar{q} = \frac{1}{1 - \pi^b_{t_a} + \pi^b_{t_b}} e^{-\frac{1}{m}(t_b - t_a)} q_{t_a}
\]

(F.18a)

\[
\frac{\psi}{\lambda} = \frac{\frac{1}{m}(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \left( L - PV^b_r \right) \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m})(t_b - t_a)} \right) + (1 - q_0) \left( PV^b_r - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \frac{1}{m} \bar{V}^b}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \right) e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t_a)} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{1}{m}(t_g - t_a)} \right)
\]

(F.18b)

\[
t_g = t_b + \frac{1}{r + \phi} \log \left( \frac{V^b_t - PV^b_r}{L - PV^b_r} \right).
\]

(F.18c)

The final step for the equilibrium to find conditions for an equilibrium with learning (i.e. \( t_a > 0 \)). Let \( \bar{t}_a \) be the threshold the first time \( q_t = \bar{q} \) in the benchmark model in which \( \psi = 0 \), which is the same as if \( t_a = t_b \). On the other hand, if \( t_a = \bar{t}_a \equiv \frac{1}{m} \log \left( \frac{\bar{q}}{q_0} \right) \) we have that \( \inf \{ t > t_a : q_t = \bar{q} \} = \infty \). We have already shown that if \( t_a = \bar{t}_a \), then \( \Gamma_{t_a} = 0 < \psi/\lambda \). Thus, in any equilibrium \( t_a < \bar{t}_a \). Hence, it is sufficient to show that if \( t_a = \bar{t}_a \), then \( \Gamma_{t_a} > \psi/\lambda \). We have that \( \lim_{t_a \rightarrow \bar{t}_a} t_g = \lim_{t_a \rightarrow \bar{t}_a} t_b = \infty \), which means that

\[
\psi \frac{1}{m} \frac{(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \left( L - PV^b_r \right) \left( 1 - e^{-(r + \phi + \frac{1}{m})(t_g - t_a)} \right) + (1 - q_0) \left( PV^b_r - \frac{c + \phi \theta R + \frac{1}{m} \bar{V}^b}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \right) e^{-(r + \phi)(t_g - t_a)} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{1}{m}(t_g - t_a)} \right) \rightarrow \frac{1}{m} \frac{(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \left( L - PV^b_r \right)
\]

Hence, there is \( t_a \in (\bar{t}_a, \bar{t}_a) \) such that \( \lambda \Gamma_t = \psi \) if and only if

\[
\frac{\psi}{\lambda} < \frac{1}{m} \frac{(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} \left( L - PV^b_r \right).
\]

Finally, we can verify that if the previous condition is not satisfied, then there is no learning in equilibrium. Suppose that the firm never learns and never goes to the market. In this case, we have the value of the project being

\[ V^u = PV^u_r = \frac{c + \phi (q_0 + (1 - q_0) \theta) R}{r + \phi} , \]

so that the value of bank at loan rate \( y \) is

\[ B^u = \frac{yF + \frac{1}{m} \bar{V}^u + \phi (q_0 + (1 - q_0) \theta) R}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} . \]

Next, suppose that the bank becomes informed (which only occurs off the equilibrium
path). In this case, for any loan rate $y$, the continuation value for the good and bad types are

$$B^b = \frac{y + \frac{1}{m}L + \phi \theta F}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}}$$

$$B^g = \frac{y + \frac{1}{m}V^g + \phi F}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}},$$

where

$$V^g = PV_r^g.$$ Combining the previous expressions, we get that

$$q_0 B^g + (1 - q_0) B^b - B^u = \frac{1}{m} \frac{(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} (L - PV_r^b),$$

which means that not learning is optimal if

$$\frac{\psi}{\lambda} \geq \frac{1}{m} \frac{(1 - q_0)}{r + \phi + \frac{1}{m}} (L - PV_r^b)$$